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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988 Supp.)-
1 
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Judgment and Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated 
December 23, 1988. A copy of said judgment is attached hereto in 
the Addendum. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
IS THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GRAHNS AND GREGORY VOIDABLE 
BY GREGORY AND IS REFORMATION OF THE CONTRACT IMPROPER 
WHERE THE PARTIES MADE A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF A MATERIAL 
FACT WHICH WAS A BASIC ASSUMPTION OF THE CONTRACT AND 
MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE AGREED PERFORMANCES OF THE 
PARTIES, AND ADVERSELY AFFECTS GREGORY? 
IS THE CONTRACT BETWEEN GREGORY AND GRAHNS VOIDABLE BY 
GREGORY WHERE GREGORY MADE A UNILATERAL MISTAKE AND 
WHERE IT IS UNCONSCIONABLE TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT, 
WHERE THE MISTAKE RELATES TO A MATERIAL FEATURE OF THE 
CONTRACT, THE MISTAKE OCCURRED NOTWITHSTANDING 
GREGORY'S EXERCISE OF ORDINARY DILIGENCE, AND WHERE THE 
COURT CAN GRANT RESCISSION WITHOUT SERIOUS PREJUDICE 
TO GRAHNS EXCEPT THE LOSS OF THEIR BARGAIN. 
WAS REFORMATION OF THE DEED IMPROPER BECAUSE THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN GRAHNS AND GREGORY WAS MERGED INTO THE 
DEED TO THE 1.11 ACRE PARCEL BY A METES AND BOUNDS 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION? 
WHERE THE DEED REFERS TO METES AND BOUNDS AND WHERE THE 
PARTIES ORALLY MADE REFERENCE TO A ROAD, DOES THE METES 
AND BOUNDS DESCRIPTION PREVAIL WHERE THE TWO 
MEASUREMENTS ARE INCONSISTENT, AND ITS REFORMATION OF 
THE DEED IMPROPER? 
3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, or rules which this defendant/appellant 
cites in his brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court on December 23, 1988 by the Honorable 
John A. Rokich. The case is a dispute about the sale of real 
property. The court below ordered specific performance and 
reformation of the contract for sale of Parcel 1 to include the 
Private Drive and ordered that the Grahns pay an additional sum 
for the additional acreage. (See Judgment and Order, Record p. 
543, a copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum) 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ORIGINAL DIVISION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION 
This Statement of Facts is generally consistent with the 
Findings of Fact which are reproduced in the Addendum. 
1. On or about July 15, 1930 Albert and Caroline Eccles 
acquired by deed a parcel of property containing approximately 
2.7 acres of land. (See Record, p. 41) (See Transcript, p. 415, 
L. 25 - p. 416, L. 24) 
2. In about 1961, Caroline Eccles and her husband Albert 
divided the property, without applying for subdivision approval, 
and sold part of that land, retaining approximately 1.67 acres. 
(See Record, p. 41) 
3. On or about May 17, 1978 Caroline Eccles conveyed the 
5 
remaining approximate 1.67 acres, which is the subject of this 
matter, for estate planning purposes, to Herold L. Gregory 
Trustee of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles 
Family Trust (hereinafter "Gregory" or "Gregorys"). The 1.67 
acre parcel is commonly known as 2811 Brookburn Road. (See 
Record, p. 41). 
4. The Eccles made improvements to the property including 
construction of a home, referred to hereinafter as the "Home". 
(See Record, p. 41) 
5. The Eccles also constructed a private drive on the 
property for access to the Home. The private drive is 
hereinafter referred to as the "Private Drive." The Private 
Drive is the only existing access to the Estate. (See Record, p. 
41, 42) 
6. Approximately five years ago, the Gregory divided the 
1.67 acre parcel to create two separate contiguous parcels so 
that Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of Gregory, could build a 
residence on the adjoining parcel to be divided from the 1.67 
acre parcel. Gregory hired Scott McNeil of McNeil Engineering, 
(hereinafter "Defendant McNeil"), to survey the property and 
divide it into the two separate parcels. (See Record, p. 42) (See 
Transcript p. 418, L. 18) 
7. Barbara Danielson instructed Defendant McNeil to create 
on the southeastern side of the property a parcel comprised of at 
least one-half acre. She also instructed Defendant McNeil to 
create a legal description for the 1/2 acre parcel of property, 
6 
hereinafter referred to as "Parcel 2." (See Record, p. 42) (See 
Transcript, p. 222, L. 4-21) 
8. Mrs, Danielson instructed Defendant McNeil to survey 
the 1.67 acre parcel and determine whether there would be a 
usable, buildable lot of one-half acre or more if the survey used 
the southeast side of the Private Drive as a boundary. (See 
Record, p. 42) (See Transcript, p. 235, L. 16-25; p. 236, L. 1-4; 
p. 222, L. 9-12) The survey was Exhibit 1-P at trial, and a copy 
is attached hereto in the Addendum and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
9. In instructing Defendant McNeil to create a 1/2 acre 
parcel, Gregory was aware that a Salt Lake County Zoning 
Ordinance (§ 22-14-4 for Zone R121, which is where the property 
is located) , required a minimum of a 1/2 acre parcel of real 
property for a party to construct a personal residence. (See 
transcript, p. 300, L. 9-12) Gregory then divided the property 
and sold parcel 2 as a separate parcel, intending that is 
contained at lease one-half acre in order to meet zoning 
requirements and in order for the parcel to be big enough tc 
build upon. At the time they sold Parcel 1 to the Grahns, they 
did not intend to convey to them more than the acreage contained 
in the description upon which they were relying, (1.11 acres) anz 
that description had been derived from the erroneous survey. (See 
Transcript, p. 300, L. 3-25; p. 301, L. 1-15) 
10. During the month of June 1984, Defendant McNeil 
surveyed the 1.67 acre parcel and created a survey and legal 
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description for Parcel 2. The survey dated July 10, 1984 
included a certified legal description for Parcel 2 purporting to 
include 0.56 acres. (See Record, p. 42, 43) (See Transcript, p. 
223, L. 2-21) 
11. Defendant McNeil intended and believed that the legal 
description he created for Parcel 2 described a parcel of real 
property approximately 0.56 acres in size and that the property 
so described was situated south and east of the Private Drive, 
and did not include in the description any part of the Private 
Drive. (See Record, p. 43) 
12. According to the survey the remaining parcel on which 
the Home was located contained approximately 1.11 acres. This 
parcel is referred to as Parcel 1. 
13. Gregory deed Parcel 2 to Barbara Danielson but she 
decided not to build on Parcel 2 and deeded the parcel back tc 
Gregory. (See Transcript p. 420, L. 1-11; p.157 L. 10-12) 
SALE OF PARCEL 1 
14. During the Summer of 1984, Gregory listed for sale 
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 (See Record, p. 43) 
15. Beginning on or about January 1986, Grahns began tc 
negotiate with Gregory to purchase Parcel 1. During these 
negotiations, Grahns inquired of Herold L. Gregory trustee of the 
Trust, and his wife Mary Ethel Gregory, about the relation of the 
Private Drive to the property line between the lots. The 
Gregorys told Grahns the east side of the Private Drive was 
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approximately the dividing line between the lots based on 
McNeil's survey (See Record, p. 43, 44) (See Transcript p. 161, 
L. 6-10) 
16. The Gregorys represented to Grahns that they had asked 
the surveyor, Defendant McNeil, to create a legal description for 
Parcel 2 (referring to it as the half-acre lot) , and that 
Defendant McNeil had prepared a survey designating a boundary 
line as approximately the southeasterly edge of the Private 
Drive. (See Record, p. 44) 
17. The Grahns relied on those representations, among other 
things, in purchasing Parcel 1. (See Record, p. 44) 
18. On or about March 18, 1986, Grahns and Gregory entered 
into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the purchase of Parcel 
1. The parties also agreed to (1) an option to purchase, first 
right of refusal applicable to Parcel 2, and (2) a written 
restrictive aesthetic and geologic easement on Parcel 2 across 
the fifteen feet nearest the Private Drive, "as an aesthetic 
break between the properties as well as a geologic protectlON 
against erosion onto the (Parcel 1) property". Said Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement was Exhibit 2 P at trial, and is attached 
hereto in its entirety in the Addendum and incorporated herein by 
this reference. (See Record, p. 44) 
19. Grahns accepted the existing survey upon purchasing 
Parcel 1 and, in fact, never requested to see a copy of the 
existing survey. (See Transcript, p. 303, L. 1-8) 
20. As part of the negotiations, Gregory rejected a request 
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from Grahns for an affirmative covenant that the property had 
been divided in compliance with law. Gregory through its Trustee 
explained that the properties were described on separate tax 
notices, and seemed already to be divided according to the legal 
descriptions of the two parcels. (See Record, p. 44, 45) 
21. During the negotiation Grahns requested Gregory to 
grant them a 25-foot easement on Parcel 2 alo.ng the Private 
Drive. Gregory denied Grahns request but agreed to give Grahns 
the 15-foot easement. (See transcript, p. 182, L. 19 - p. 184, L. 
23) 
22. On or about August 1, 1986, Grahns and Gregory closed 
on the transaction for the sale of Parcel 1. The parties used 
the legal description attached to the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement dated March 18, 1986. Josephine Grahn obtained the 
legal description for Parcel 1 from the records of Salt Lake 
County. Apparently the county derived its legal description for 
its records by taking the description of Parcel 2 from the 
description of the entire 1.67 acre parcel. This description 
included a reference to 1.11 acres of land. (See Record, p. 45) 
23. Grahns and Gregory were under the impression the 
Private Drive (excepting that portion which constitutes an 
easement over a corner of a neighboring lot which is not the 
subject of this lawsuit) was included within Parcel 1. (See 
Record, p. 45) 
24. Parcel 1 contains 1.11 acres as referred to in the 
legal description of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement although 
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it does not include the Private Drive as both parties, innocently 
and mistakenly understood. (See Record, p. 117) 
25. There was no overlap in the descriptions of the deeds 
for Parcels 1 and 2. (See Transcript, p. 239, L.l-5; p. 327, L. 
1-13; p. 197, L. 4-10) 
26. When Gregory entered into their contract with Grahns tc 
sell Parcel 1, Gregory intended to sell Parcel 1 which contained 
approximately one acre so that Parcel 2 would contain at least 
1/2 acre in order to be buildable and marketable. Had Gregory 
known about the mistake in the survey, he never would have sold 
Parcel 1. (See Transcript, p. 301, L. 5-26; p. 316, L. 8-17; p. 
238, L. 18-20; p. 246, L. 8-18) 
SALE OF PARCEL 2 
27. On September 1, 1986, Defendant Bradshaw entered into 
an Earnest Money Sales Agreement with Gregory for the purchase of 
Parcel 2. Said Agreement was part of Exhibit 7-P at trial, a 
copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum. Said Agreement 
was a legal and binding agreement. (See Exhibit 7-P) (See 
Transcript, p. 176, L. 21, 22) 
28. On September 1, 1986 Dean Bradshaw offered to Gregory 
to purchase Parcel 2 pursuant to an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. A copy of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is 
attached hereto in the Addendum and by reference made a par*: 
hereof. Gregory accepted Bradshaw!s offer to purchase en 
September 2, 1986 subject to the Grahn's option and right c: 
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first refusal. 
29. On September 1, 1986, pursuant to the "First Option to 
Purchase" contained in the March 18, 1986 Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, Gregory gave written notice to Grahns of his intent to 
sell Parcel 2 to Bradshaw, and extended to Grahns the first right 
of refusal to purchase Parcel 2. (See Record, p. 45) The letter 
providing notice to the Grahns was Exhibit No. 7-P at trial, and 
a copy is attached hereto in the Addendum and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
30., Grahns did not exercise their right of first refusal to 
purchase Parcel 2 in accordance with the terms of the March 18, 
1986 Agreement and the option expired on September 8, 1986. (See 
Record, p. 45) 
31. Bradshaw relied upon the 1984 McNeil survey in 
tendering his September 1, 1986 offer which was accepted by 
Gregory. The survey indicated that Parcel 2 contained 0.56 
acres of land with certain calls and dimensions shown on the 
survey to extend generally to the southeasterly line of the 
Private Drive. (See Record, p. 46) (p. 369, L. 6-13) 
32. On or about September 3, 1986, Josephine M. Grahn 
telephoned Christi Bradshaw, Dean Bradshawfs wife, and informed 
her that Bradshaws might not be able to build on Parcel 2 because 
Gregory had not complied with the Salt Lake County subdivision 
ordinances. As a result of the phone call, Bradshaw told Gregory 
about the conversation. On September 5, 1986, as a result of the 
phone call Gregory filed a request with Salt Lake County Planning 
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Commission for permission to divide the 1.67 acre parcel into a 
1.11 acre and a 0.56 acre parcel according to the calls and 
dimensions set forth on the 1984 McNeil survey and the 1985 
property tax notices. The descriptions and request were 
consistent with the description previously conveyed to Grahns. 
(See Record, p. 46) 
33. On October 11, 1986, Dean Bradshaw discovered by 
measurement on Parcel 2 that the Private Drive apparently was not 
located where indicated on the 1984 McNeil survey and as a 
consequence there was inadequate land between the Private Drive 
and the southeasterly boundary to locate the Home which he had 
designed and planned to build on Parcel 2. Bradshaw immediately 
advised Gregory of the problem and Gregory contacted Defendant 
McNeil. (See Record, p. 46, 47) 
34. Bradshaw was not aware of any problem with the survey 
at the time he made his offer to purchase the .56 acre lot or at 
any time prior to October 11, 1986. (See Record, p. 48, Record, 
p. 190) 
35. By the time Bradshaw discovered the discrepancy with 
the survey measurements, he had already become extremely 
emotionally attached to Parcel 2 and had expended considerable 
time and money in designing and preparing for construction of his 
home on the property, and arranging for subdivision of the 
property. He had sold his home and moved to a rental property 
on Brookburn Drive across the street from Parcel 2. He had 
entered into a lease agreement for approximately six months to 
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allow him to complete construction of his home. On April 15, 
1987 Bradshaws had to move from the rental property. (See 
Transcript, p. 385, L. 13-22; p. 397, L. 17-20; p. 400, L. 7 - p. 
401, L. 2) He contracted with an architect to obtain plans for 
the home. (See Transcript, p. 398, L. 6-18) He and his wife 
built a scale model of the home. (See Transcript, p. 397, L. 25-
p. 398, L. 2; p. 372, L. 14 - p. 373, L. 5) He contracted with 
Rocky Mountain Refractory for certain materials for the house. 
(See Trcinscript, p. 401, L. 13 - p. 403, L. 8) He made sketches 
of the house and property in evenings and on weekends. (See 
Transcript, p. 364, L. 20-24) 
36. In October, 1986 McNeil reviewed his survey and 
subsequently confirmed that he believed he had made an error in 
the location of the Private Drive on the survey. The dimensions 
of Parcel 2 extended across the Private Drive and a major portion 
of the Private Drive is actually within the description of Parcel 
2 and not Parcel 1. (See Record, p. 47) 
37. At the time the mistake was discovered, and even at the 
time the Complaint was filed in this lawsuit, the Grahns had not 
moved into the Home on Parcel 1. The Complaint was filed in 
November of 1986 and the Grahns did not move into the home until 
June 13, 1987. (See Transcript, p. 55, L. 12-16) 
38. Even at trial, Gregory did not understand the true 
relationship between the location of the Private Drive and the 
boundaries between Parcels 1 and 2. (See transcript, p. 198, L. 
11-17) 
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39. On October 23, 1986, McNeil prepared a revised drawing 
showing what he believed to be tne relationship of the Private 
Drive to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. (See Record, p. 47) The revised 
drawing was Exhibit 9-P at trial, and a copy is attached hereto 
in the Addendum and by reference made a part hereof. 
40. Defendant McNeil subsequently prepared a revised 
survey, showing the correct boundaries. Said survey was Exhibit 
12-P at trial and a copy is attached hereto int he Addendum and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
41. Gregory did not notify Grahns of the problem until 
November 21, 1986 because Gregory awaited subdivision approval by 
the County. The county postponed the decision until November 19, 
1986 when they granted the Gregory's request to subdivide the 
property. (See Record, p. 47) 
42. On November 20, 1986, on demand of Bradshaw, Gregory 
conveyed Parcel 2 to Dean and Christi Bradshaw according to the 
September 1, 1986, Earnest Money Sales Agreement. (See Record, p. 
47) 
43. On November 21, 1986, Gregory informed Grahns in a 
letter of the problem survey and offered to Grahns a choice to 
rescind the Agreement due to mutual mistake, or to have Gregory 
build a replacement driveway on Parcel 1. That letter was 
Exhibit 8-P at trial, and a copy is attached hereto in the 
Addendum and by reference made a part hereof. Gregory did not 
inform Grahns until November 21, 1986 because Gregory did not 
understand what the full implications of the survey problem were. 
15 
(See Record, p. 48) 
44. All parties to the purchase of sale of Parcel 1 and 2 
relied on the original survey prepared by Defendant McNeil. 
Additionally, the Planning and Zoning Commission, during the 
process of legally subdividing the property, relied on that same 
survey. (See Transcript, p. 81, L. 20 - p. 82, L. 19; p. 83, L. 
7-16; p. 168, L. 2-23; p. 369, L. 6-13) 
45. At no time prior to October 11, 1986 were any of the 
parties, Grahns, Gregory, Bradshaw or McNeil, aware of the mutual 
mistake regarding the location of the Private Drive in relation 
to Parcels 1 and 2. (See Record, p. 48) At trial the Court 
ordered specific performance and reformation of the contract for 
Parcel 1 to include the Private Drive and ordered that the Grahns 
pay an additional sum for the additional acreage. (See Record, p. 
536) 
46« Leaving Parcel 2 with less than one-half acre would 
render that parcel unbuildable due to the steep terrain which 
much of Parcel 2 contains. (See Transcript, p. 268, L. 6 - p. 
269, L. 2; p. 185, L. 22 - p. 186, L. 6) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The parties to this action, Gregory, Grahns, and Bradshaws 
all entered into contracts for purchase and sale of real property 
based on a mutual mistake of a material fact which was a basic 
assumption of the contract, which materially affected the agreed 
performances of the parties and adversely affects Gregory and the 
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Bradshaws. If all the facts had been known to Gregory, he would 
not have entered into the contract with the Grahns. It is 
unconscionable that the trial Court ordered specific performance 
and reformation of the contract which causes serious and 
irreparable injury to Gregory and the Bradshaws. 
The only remedy available to the parties is rescission. As 
a result of the mutual mistake, both contracts for sale of Parcel 
1 and 2 are voidable by Gregory. Rescission is the only 
appropriate remedy under these facts. There were two material 
facts which were the basic assumptions of the contract. The 
first fact was the parties believed Parcel 1 contained 1.11 acres 
and Parcel 2 contained .56 acres. The second fact was that the 
boundary between the two parcels was the Private Drive. The 
basis for the parties assumption was an erroneous survey on the 
property. No property existed which consisted of two parcels 
which contained 1.11 acres and .56 acres and which were divided 
by the Private Drive. Because no such property existed, there 
was no meeting of the minds of the parties and therefore no 
enforceable contract. 
The trial court granted a reformation of the sale of parcel 
1 to Grahns and rescinded the sale of Parcel 2 to the Bradshaws. 
In reforming the contract for sale of Parcel 1, the Court ordered 
the additional land necessary to include the road be included in 
the legal description of Parcel 1. In addition to giving the 
Grahns the additional acreage, the Court ordered Gregory to grant 
the Grahns an easement for 15 feet beyond and adjacent to the 
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additional acreage. The Court required the Grahns pay an 
additional sum for the additional acreage. 
The Court cannot remake for the parties a contract which 
they themselves did not make. By taking the additional acreage 
from Parcel 2, Gregory was left with an odd shaped, unbuildable 
parcel of ground and lost a contract for the sale of Parcel 2. 
The Court has ordered the parties to accept a contract which 
materially affected the agreed performances of the parties and 
adversely affects Gregory* 
Even if the Gregory had made a unilateral mistake the Courts 
hold that unilateral mistake is grounds for rescission where the 
mistake causes an unconscionable result. 
Reformation of the deed was improper on another basis. The 
contract for the sale of Parcel 1 between the Grahns and Gregory 
was merged into the deed containing a metes and bounds legal 
description which referred to 1.11 acres. It is improper for the 
Court to reform the agreement between the parties. 
Reformation is also improper where the parties agreed upon a 
deed which refers to a metes and bounds description and the 
parties orally referred to a driveway where the two measurements 
are inconsistent because the metes and bounds description 
prevails where the two measurements are inconsistent. 
The trial court therefore erred in reforming the contract. 
The proper equitable remedy in this case is avoidance of the 
contract, not reformation of this agreement into one which the 
parties would have never made for themselves. For the above 
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reasons, this court should reverse the judgment of the court 
below, and grant rescission of the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE GRAHNS AND GREGORY IS 
VOIDABLE BY GREGORY AND REFORMATION OF THE 
CONTRACT IS IMPROPER WHERE THE PARTIES MADE A 
MUTUAL MISTAKE OF A MATERIAL FACT WHICH WAS A 
BASIC ASSUMPTION OF THE CONTRACT AND MATERIALLY 
AFFECTS THE AGREED PERFORMANCES OF THE PARTIES AND 
ADVERSELY AFFECTS GREGORY. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 describes the 
situation where a party may rescind an agreement based upon a 
mutual mistake of fact: "Where a mistake of both parties at the 
time the contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made and has a material affect on the agreed 
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the 
adversely affected party unless he bears the risk the mistake..." 
Utah courts have adopted the RESTATEMENT position. See Mooney v. 
G.R. and Associates, 746 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Ut. App. 1987). 
Kiahtioes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 1982), Renner v. Kehl, 
722 P.2d 262, 264-265 (Ariz. 1986). See also Tanner v. District 
Judges of the Third Judicial District Court, 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 
1982). 
A. Distinction Between Reformation and Rescission Mistake 
as to a Basic Assumption on Which the Contract is Made. 
Reformation and rescission are related but distinct concepts 
in contract law. Reformation is appropriate where a written 
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contract does not accurately reflect the intent or agreement of 
the parties, and is re-formed to reflect the real agreement. 
Rescission is appropriate where there was no complete, antecedent 
agreement and no meeting of the minds due to the failure of a 
basic assumption of the parties, critical to that agreement. It 
is "the unmaking of a contract or the undoing of it from the 
beginning, and not merely a termination... ." Black*s Law 
Dictionary 1174 (5th ed. 1979). 
A party may rescind a contract when at the time the contract 
is made the parties make a mutual mistake about a material fact, 
the existence if which is a basic assumption about the contract. 
The Court allows reformation in instances of a mutual 
mistake as a result of a drafter error. See Hottinaer v. Jensen, 
684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1984). Reformation is clearly appropriate 
when there is a variance between the written deed and the true 
agreement of the parties caused by a draftsman. 
The mutual mistake under the contract before this Court is 
not merely a question of a variance between a written deed and 
true agreement of the parties caused by a draftsman. But rather 
it goes to the very assumption under which the parties agreed. 
Not only was the road to be included in parcel 1, but that Parcel 
1 was to include only 1.11 acres. The Court held reformation was 
appropriate and added additional acreage to Parcel 1. This also 
had a material affect upon the agreed exchange of performance and 
upset the very basis for the contract. 
The distinction between reformation and rescission is set 
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forrh in Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co,, et al, 37 N.E.2d 760 
(111. 1941) which has been followed by many courts as 
establishing the standard for distinguishing between these two 
equitable remedies. In Harley the Court stated: 
Mistakes are generally divided into two 
groups, first those fundamental in character, 
relating to an essential element of the 
contract which prevent a meeting of the minds 
of the parties and so no agreement is made. 
These generally have to do with such matters 
as the existence and identity of the subject 
matter, areas as to price, quantity, and the 
like. In the other class of mistakes an 
actual good faith understanding is reached, 
but through some error, not expressed, the 
agreement reduced to writing is not the 
actual agreement. The former of these 
classes constitutes around for rescission, 
but not reformation, while the latter may be 
reformed. 
Id., at 765. (emphasis added). 
Grahns argued and the court below partially agreed that 
there was a mistake in the contract, and the deed as drawn up by 
the Plaintiff's scrivener, in that it did not include the Private 
Drive with parcel 1 as was intended by both parties. The mistake 
was much more than merely in the writing itself. The mistake was 
more than not being an accurate expression of the true agreement. 
The mistake of the parties in the case went not to the mere 
memorialization of their agreement, but went to the very nature 
of the subject of their negotiation. The original parcel was 
divided into parcels 1 and 2 prior to negotiations to sell parcel 
1 to the Grahns. Grahns did not request that Gregory subdivide 
the original parcel in a certain manner. Indeed, Grahns relied 
on the legal description from survey as previously made, rather 
than have a new survey prepared. In fact, Mrs. Grahn obtained 
the lecjal description from Salt Lake County, which description 
the county based on McNeil's survey. Therefore, in making the 
contract, the parties both relied on an erroneous survey and 
description. All parties made a mistake with regard to a basic 
assumption of the contract that the driveway was included as part 
of parcel 1. 
The mistake of the parties was not in reducing the parties' 
intent to writing but in the very nature of the property itself. 
There was actually no mistake made in the writing itself. The 
contract accurately reflected the intent of the parties, which 
was to transfer parcel 1. Gregory did transfer parcel 1 as they 
understood parcel 1 to be. Their mistake was in their mutual 
basic assumption that the property description and dimensions of 
parcels 1 and 2 according to the survey also used the road as the 
boundary when in fact the road was not the boundary. This 
assumption was a mistake, "fundamental in character, relating to 
an essential element of the contract"; prevented the meeting of 
the minds of the parties; and therefore no contract was ever 
made. (See Harley, supra.) 
66 AM. JUR. 2d Reformation of Instruments § 13 (1973) sets 
forth the elements for reformation of a contract on the ground of 
mistake and explains when rescission is appropriate: 
There must be an antecedent agreement which 
the written instrument evidences, and the 
mistake must have been in the drafting of the 
instrument, not in the making of the 
contract. An instrument will not be reformed 
on the ground of a mere misunderstanding of 
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facts, or a mistake as to an extrinsic fact 
which, if known, would probably have induced 
the making of a different contract or no 
contract at all. If there has been any 
misunderstanding between the parties, or a 
misapprehension by one or both, so that their 
minds have not met, no contract has been 
entered into, and the court will not make for 
them a contract which they did not make. 
As shown above, the mistake in the instant case was not in 
the drafting of the instrument, but was in the making of the 
contract. It was a mistake as to an extrinsic fact (the nature 
of the subject property), which was the basis of the agreement. 
In the case of Metzler v. Bolen, (DC ND) 137 F. Supp. 457, 
(1956), the court stated: 
A mistake which leads one or both parties to 
enter into a contract which they would not 
have entered into had they known the facts 
will not justify reformation. 
The contract was based upon a mutual mistake of material 
fact, which if known by the parties, would have prevented any 
agreement. Parcel 2 is located on a steep hill. If the contract 
for sale of parcel 1 is enforced the driveway and easement to 
parcel 1 not only reduces parcel 2 to less than 1/2 acre, but 
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to build on it, and 
severely affects the marketability of parcel 2. The parties 
would not have intended to enter into an agreement to divide a 
piece of land into two parcels and then to transfer one parcel, 
leaving the other parcel so small as to be effectively unusable 
and unmarketable. 
A case from the Court of Appeals of Maryland is very close 
on point with the instant case. In Chesapeake Homes, Inc. v. 
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McGraff, 240 A.2d 245 (Md. App. 1968), the vendor of a parcel of 
property innocently misrepresented the rear boundary to include 
more area than actually included. The Court granted rescission 
rather than reformation of the contract. The case was similar 
with the instant case. Both parties were mistaken as to the 
correct boundary of a lot that had been divided previously from a 
larger parcel. The Court in Chesapeake Homes could have viewed 
the mistake as variance between the written deed and the true 
agreement of the parties caused by a draftsman or a mistake of a 
material fact which was a basic assumption of the contract. 
Grahns advanced this same argument in our case. In Chesapeake, 
the Court held that: 
"Where the facts show the mutual mistake to 
be actually a product of false, although 
innocent, representations as to the subject 
matter of the contract, the result is that 
the parties have not in fact come to any 
agreement, and reformation will not correct 
the effort. This is easily absorbed within 
the facts of the present case. It is not the 
description of the land in the contract which 
is a mistake, but the identity of the lot 
itself. Therefore, reformation was not the 
proper remedy." 
The mistake in the instant case, as in Chesapeake Homes did 
not occur in the drafting of the instrument, but involved the 
identity of the property in question, the actual boundaries as 
then divided, and the overall ability of the original parcel to 
be divided into two smaller parcels as the parties intended. As 
in Chesapeake Homes, the parties in the instant case accurately 
identified the parcel in question on their contractual agreement. 
They were incorrect in their perception of the boundaries of that 
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parcel. 
The Utah Supreme Court further confirms this point int he 
case of Ingram v. Forrer. 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977). The Court 
held "an honest difference of understanding as to what the 
contract was is fatal to reformation for in such case there is no 
such meeting of the minds of the parties and no pre-existing 
agreement to which the written instrument can be conformed." 
In the case of Eiland v. Powell, 136 W.Va. 25, 65 S.E.2d 
737, the Court stated: 
Under the cloak of reformation of a contract 
or deed, a court of equity cannot convey 
property which the parties themselves did 
not, in fact, sell and purchase or intend to 
sell and purchase. 
In making their contract for the sale of real estate, the 
defendants in the instant case intended to sell, and Grahns 
intended to purchase, a parcel of land under a mistaken 
assumption as to its boundaries and measurements. They would not 
have intended to transfer part of the land, leaving the rest too 
small to be buildable or marketable. 
The Court in Lemocre Electric v« County of San Mateo, 4 6 
Cal.2d 659, 297 P.2d 638 (1956), stated that: 
A court cannot rewrite the contract which the 
parties have made so as to express an 
argument which they did not enter into. 
When the court below ruled that the contract be reformed to 
include the driveway in parcel 1, and for the Grahns to pay 
additional monies to cover the extra land they were receiving, 
the effect was to force the parties into an agreement which they 
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had not made. The Court, in effect, wrote a new contract for the 
parties since Gregory had not intended to enter into a contract 
which would render parcel 2 too small to be buildable and the 
Grahns had not intended to pay extra monies. 
As set forth above, 66 AM JUR 2d Reformation of Instruments 
§ 13 (1973) states: 
If there has been any misunderstanding 
between the parties, or a misapprehension by 
one or both, so that their minds have not 
met, no contract has been entered into, and 
the court will not make for them a contract 
which they did not make. 
The parties in the instant case were mistaken as to an 
extrinsic fact, essential to the agreement. If the facts had 
been known, the parties would likely not have entered into a 
contract, or at most would have entered into a totally different 
contract. Their minds therefore did not meet; no contract has 
actually occurred, and the court below erred in making for them 
one which they did not make. 
RESTATEMENT § 155 Comment B states that if "the parties make 
a written agreement that they would not otherwise have made 
because of a mistake other than one as to expression, the Court 
will not reform a writing to reflect the agreement that it thinks 
they would have made. The remedy in that case is avoidance.11 
Illustration No. 5 to Section 155 demonstrates that courts should 
not reform agreements transferring a tract of land when the 
parties are mistaken as to the size of that tract of land, as is 
the situation in the instant case. That illustration is as 
follows: 
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A contracts to sell and B to buy a tract of 
land, described in the contract as containing 
one hundred acres, at a price of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars. Both parties believe that 
area is one hundred acres, but in fact, it is 
only ninety acres. The Court will not, at 
the request of B, reform the writing because 
the mistake of the parties was not one as to 
its contents or effect. 
The parties in the instant case were not mistaken as to the 
contents or effect of their contract. They negotiated for, and 
executed the transfer of parcel 1 as then constituted. Their 
mistake was in an extrinsic fact on which the agreement was based 
- the sise and attributes of the subject property. As 
RESTATEMENT reiterates above, the Court then should not have 
reformed the writing at the request of trie purchasers since the 
mistake was not one as to the contents and effect of the 
contract. 
A mistake resting upon an extrinsic fact should not justify 
reformation of a contract; only a mistake going to the writing 
itself will justify reformation (King v. Factory Direct, Inc. , 
639 S.W.2d 627, 636 (Mo. App. 1982). 
B. Affect of the Mistake Upon the Agreed Exchange of 
Performances of the Parties. 
Reforming the contract in the instant case would seriously 
affect the parties' rights. RESTATEMENT fSECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
152(1) states that a mutual mistake makes a contract voidable 
when "a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made 
has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances....11 
If the attributes of the property in question were fully known by 
the parties involved, the small size irregular shape and steep 
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terrain of what is left of Parcel 2 may indeed have necessitated 
the sale of the entire property as a whole, since the value, 
usefulness and marketability of Parcel 2 was severely affected. 
In that event, the Grahns could not have purchased the entire 
1.67 acre parcel. By so ruling the Court has severely affected 
the value of Gregory's asset. 
Grahns and the court below, interpreted the mistake to be a 
mistake in the writing of the instrument. By doing so they have 
ignored the fact that it was Defendants1 original intention to 
separate a one-half acre lot from the original parcel and sell to 
Grahns the remaining 1.1 acre lot. This would have left a 
buildable, marketable half-acre lot, thus enabling the original 
parcel to be sold as two separate smaller parcels, rather than 
necessitating its sale as a whole. 
By allowing the lower court's ruling to stand the value, 
usefulness and marketability of Parcel 2 is severely restricted. 
C. Rescission is the proper remedy. 
The Utah courts have recognized in Mooney v. G.R. 
Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Ut. App. 1987), Kiahtipes v. Mills, 
649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1987) and Tanner v. District Judges of Third 
Judicial District. 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982) that an agreement as 
the one before this Court is subject to equitable rescission. 
The Court of Appeals of Utah recently ruled for equitable 
rescission of a contract based on mutual mistake in Robert 
Lanqston, Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah App. 1987), 
a case closely on point with the instant case. Lanqston involved 
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a contract for the sale of cattle and certain grazing permits. 
The parties were mistaken as to the exact boundaries of the 
grazing permits* In addition, although they had agreed on a 
price per head for the cattle, they were mistaken as to the total 
cost and price for the cattle, Id.. 741 P.2d at 556. The court 
in Lanaston could have reformed the contract to reflect the 
proper grazing permit boundaries without affecting the rights of . 
the parties to the contract or any third party, and also had a 
clear standard for reforming the price per head for the cattle. 
Instead, the court in Lanaston properly recognized that the 
contract between the parties was based on mutual mistake, a 
misconception about a basic assumption or a vital fact upon which 
they based their bargain, and ruled that rescission rather than 
reformation was the proper remedy in that type of situation. 
E. Elements of Rescission 
RESTATEMENT § 152, referred to above, sets forth a standard 
determining when mutual mistake justifies rescission of a 
contract. That section is set forth here in full: 
When Mistake of Both Parties Makes A Contract 
Avoidable. 
1. Where a mistake of both parties at the time a 
contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made has a material affect on the agreed 
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by 
the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk 
of the mistake under the rules stated in Section 154. 
2. In determining whether the mistake has a 
material affect on the agreed exchange of performances, 
a count is taken of any relief by way of reformation, 
restitution, or otherwise. 
Section 152 is broken down into three basic elements by 
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Comment A to that section: 
1. The mistake must relate to a "basic assumption on which 
the contract was made." 
2. The party seeking avoidance must show that the mistake 
has a material affect upon the agreed exchange of performances. 
3. The mistake must not be one as to which the party 
seeking relief bears the risk. 
i_, Basic Assumption. 
The size of parcel 1, and consequently the size of parcel 2, 
ware basic assumptions of the contract between Grahns and 
Gregory. Not only was the acreage of parcel 1 listed in the 
contract for sale between Grahns and defendant, but, as stated 
above, the viability of parcel 2 as an independently marketable 
parcel was critical to the negotiation for the sale of parcel 1. 
The price of parcel 1 was based on the premise that Gregory could 
sail parcel 2 independently. In addition, Grahns purchased 
parcel 1 under the assumption that someone else would purchase 
parcel 2 and construct a home thereon, impinging on his privacy 
and aesthetic enjoyment of the overall parcel. Due to the 
terrain of parcel 2, the dispute regarding the size of the parcel 
i£ critical to the marketability of parcel 2. Much of parcel 2 
has a severe slope, while that portion which abuts parcel 1 is 
more level and is critical in any attempt to build on parcel 2. 
Grsthns allege that they were not concerned with the size of 
parcel 2, nor with the actual acreage of parcel 1, only that the 
driveway in question was to be included with parcel 1. Comment 
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B to RESTATEMENT § 152 notes that 
The parties may have had such a 'basic assumption1 even 
though they were not conscious of alternatives,..where, for 
example, a party purchases an annuity on the life of another 
person, it can be said that it was a basic assumption that 
the other person was alive at the time, even though the 
parties never consciously addressed themselves to the 
possibility that he was dead. 
Commenting on what constitutes a basic assumption under this 
section of the RESTATEMENT, Professor Farnsworth notes that "a 
party may have such an assumption even though he is not conscious 
of alternatives. A person walking into a room may, in this 
sense, assume that the room has a floor without thinking about 
it." Farnsworth, Contracts 654 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1982). 
All parties to the contract in the instant case assumed that 
Grahns were purchasing one of two parcels which were properly 
divided and independently viable, as separated from the original 
parcel. The size of both parcels was a basic assumption relied 
on by both Grahns and Gregory in this case. 
RESTATEMENT § 152, Illustration 2 is directly on point with 
the instant case: 
2. "A contracts to sell and B to buy a tract of land, on 
the basis of a report of a surveyor whom A has employed to 
determine the acreage. The price is, however, a lump sum 
not calculated from the acreage. Because of an error in 
computation by the surveyor, the tract contains ten percent 
more acreage than he reports. The contract is voidable by 
A." 
(Citations omitted.) Unlike many situations involving the 
transfer of residential property, the description of parcel 1 as 
containing 1.1 acres was not merely descriptive, but was 
controlling since it was critical how much land was left for 
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parcel 2. 
Grahns agreed in their Earnest Money Sales Agreement to rely 
on the prior survey rather than to commission a new one. Under 
paragraph B of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement Grahns bought 
the property "as is" thereby assuming the risk of mistake. Since 
Grahns assumed that risk, they should be estopped from reforming 
the contract. 
2. Material Effect of the Mistake on the Agreed Exchange of 
Performances and the Adversity Affected Party. 
That the mutual mistake in this case has a material affect 
on the agreed exchange of performances. If Gregory had known 
about the mistake he would not have sold the property. Comment C 
to RESTATEMENT § 152 notes that a party disadvantaged by the 
mutual mistake cannot be fairly required to carry out the 
contract "if the exchange is not only less desirable to him but 
is also more advantageous to the other party." In the instant 
case, defendant is left with severely restricted value while the 
Grahns have effectively prevented Gregory from selling or using 
Parcel 2. 
3. Bearing the Risk of the Mistake 
Gregory should not bear the risk of the mutual mistake. 
RESTATEMENT § 154 outlines three instances in which a party bears 
the risk of a mistake. Those instances are: 
A. the risk is allocated to him by agreement of 
the parties, or 
B. he is aware, at the time the contract is made, 
that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the 
facts to which the mistake relates but treats his 
limited knowledge as sufficient, or 
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C. the risk is allocated to him by the court on 
the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances 
to do so. 
The first of the grounds for allocating the risk to a party 
is applicable to the defendant in this case. As noted above, 
Grahns, r.ol liregorVi bore the risk nt h.\;i <JLIP * i i mistake from 
a survey pursuant to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement• Grahns bought the property f,as is" relying on the 
survey. It has been estab] I shed by the record that neither party 
was aware he or she was acting under limited knowledge. The only 
manner by which the Gregory may bear the risk of loss due to the 
mutual mistake in this case is if the Court finds it reasonable 
to so allocate that risk to them. It is not reasonable under 
these facts to allocate this risk to Gregory. Gregory 
appropriately contracted to have the property surveyed and 
divided, and was not an expert on surveying and describing 
property It: is reasonab Gregory to rely on the survey in 
making assumptions about the property. 
In light of the strong tradition in construing instruments 
strictly against the drafter of the instruments, if allocated to 
either party, the risk of this mutual mistake should be allocated 
to the Grahns rather than Gregory. 
In re Barrister's Land Company, Inc., 17 B , R , 8 b J (Bkrtcy. 
N.D. Miss. 1985) was a case in which the Court dealt with the 
allocation of risk of mistake regarding the size of a parcel of 
land transferred according to the parties1 contract. In that 
case, as in the instant situation, neither party was aware that 
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it was acting under limited knowledge. The Court held that: 
It is clear, also# neither party accepted the risk of 
the mistake, nor is it proper in these circumstances 
for the court to allocate the burden of risk. Neither 
party to the attempted transaction sought to rely on 
limited knowledge, knowing that such knowledge was 
limited. Each party thought that it was acting with 
full knowledge of the facts. 
Id., 57 B.R. at 866-67. That same court cited with approval the 
same sections of the RESTATEMENT cited in this brief. 
A recent case before the court of appeals of Idaho, Thieme 
v. Worst 745 P.2d. 1076 (Idaho App. 1987) dealt with a situation 
wherein both vender and purchaser were mistaken as to the 
availability of water on the property in question. In that case 
the contract was not rescinded because the party seeking 
reformation over rescission was willing to alleviate the effect 
of the mistake. Id. . 745 P.2d. at 1080. In the instant case, 
Grahns have rejected defendants1 offer to move the driveway, 
which is the cause of Defendant's contention in this matter. 
Grahns should not be allowed reformation over rescission when 
they are unwilling to accept a reasonable resolution of a 
difficult problem. 
A similar situation occurred in Runner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 
262, 264-65 (Ariz. 1986). The parties in that case believed 
there was an adequate supply of water which was "a basic 
assumption on which both parties made the contract." Citing 
RESTATEMENT § 152 the court granted rescission of the contract 
and held "the mutual mistake had such a material affect on the 




POINT II. MUTUAL MISTAKE IS A DEFENSE TO REFORMATION OF 
THE CONTRACT. 
In Manny Lumber Co. v. Vocret. 216 P.2d 674 (Or. 1950) the 
Supreme Court of Oregon, in a case dealing with the transfer of a 
logging operation, declined to reform the contract to reflect the 
mistakes in estimating the amount of timber involved with the 
transfer. Even though it would have been relatively simple for 
the court to deduce the cost per foot of timber had the parties 
agreed to that, the court declined to fill in the missing term 
for the parties, recognizing that: 
in order for a written instrument to be reformed in 
equity, it is necessary that the parties thereto shall 
previously have reached a complete mutual understanding 
with respect to all of the essential terms of their 
agreement, for otherwise there would be no standard by 
which the writing could be reformed. 
Id.. 216 P.2d at 680. 
RESTATEMENT § 155, Comment A recognizes that, in order to 
reform ci contract there must have been some agreement between the 
parties prior to the writing. Further, that Comment notes that 
fl[t]he agreement must, of course, be certain enough to permit a 
court to frame relief in terms of reformation." Grahns 
themselves, when assessed an additional $12,604.04 for the 
disputed area, argued that the contract between the parties 
lacked the certainty to make the assessment. Without the 
certainty, reformation is inappropriate. The Vermont high Court 
dealt with a similar issue. In Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A. 2d 359 
(Vt. 1987) the parties contracted for the sale of a 248 acre 
farm. The deed omitted two ten-acre lots as the parties had 
36 
agreed, The court recognized Ihal" ' the deed cannot Le reformed 
in accordance with this agreement, however, because it cannot be 
determined from the record whether providing Bourne with the 
acreage would simultaneously deprive the Lajoies of the tillable 
acreage they expected to receive." Id. , 540 A.2d at 363. 
Moreover, the court in Bourne reiterated that "a party seeking 
reformation has the burden of establishing beyond reasonable 
doubt that there existed, previous to the deed, a valid agreement 
represent :i .ng a standard to wh J ch the erroneous writing can be 
reformed, so as to express the true transaction between the 
parties." Id. , 540 A.2d at 361, (citations omitted). It would 
have been relatively simple to determine a price per acre for the 
farm in the Bourne case, However, it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine and appropriate standard by which to 
reform the price c igreemej. sferring residential 
property That situation is further complicated because it is 
impossible to the drafters of the RESTATEMENT in Comment B to 
Section 155, which states, that i f " the parties make a written 
agreement that they would not otherwise have made because of a 
mistake other th*n one as to expression, the court will not 
reform a writing t ~ effect the agreement that it thinks they 
would have made. 
POINT III. THE CONTRACT BETWEEN GREGORY AND GRAHNS IS 
VOIDABLE BY GREGORY WHERE GREGORY MADE A 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE WHERE IT IS UNCONSCIONABLE 
TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT. WHERE THE MISTAKE 
RELATES TO A MATERIAL FEATURE OF THE 
CONTRACT, THE MISTAKE OCCURRED 
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NOTWITHSTANDING GREGORY'S EXERCISE OF 
ORDINARY DILIGENCE AND WHERE THE COURT CAN 
GRANT RESCISSION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO GRAHNS 
EXCEPT THE LOSS OF THE BARGAIN 
Even assuming the Grahns in this case did not make a mistake 
regarding the size and attributes of the parcels in question, a 
unilateral mistake on the part of Gregory according to the facts 
of this case still presents sufficient equitable grounds for 
rescission of the contract. 
A contract may be equitably rescinded on the ground of 
unilateral mistake when certain elements are present. The 
general rule and elements necessary are set forth in 59 A.L.R. 
809 in a note to the case of Hurst v. National Bond & Investment 
Co,, 98 Fla. 148, 117 So. 792, 59 A.L.R. 807 (1928) as follows: 
Essential conditions to such relief are: (1) 
The mistake must be of so grave a consequence 
that to enforce the contract as actually made 
would be unconscionable. (2) The matter as 
to which the mistake was made must relate to 
a material feature of the contract. (3) 
Generally the mistake must have occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary 
diligence by the party making the mistake. 
(4) It must be possible to give relief by 
way of rescission without serious prejudice 
to the other party except the loss of his 
bargain. In other words, it must be possible 
to put him in status quo. 
The Utah Supreme Court, as early as 1951, recognized this 
general rule of equity. In Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 Utah 
650, 656, 231 P.2d 724, 727 (1951), this Court quoted verbatim 
the A.L.R. excerpt set forth above, thus embracing this rule of 
law for Utah. This court again reiterated these elements in 197 0 
in Davis v. Mulholland. 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 835 (1970) and 
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more recently in Briaas v. Liddelj., 699 P. 2d 770, 773 (Utah 
1985). 
These elements, which must be present in order to rescind a 
contract on the grounds of unilateral mistake, an e presen t in the 
instant case. 
1. Unconscionability. Grahns have argued that it is not 
unconscionable to require Gregory to transfer riveway as 
part of parcel 1, leaving Gregory with less than a half acre for 
parcel 2 It: nut , I ndeed be possible for Gregory to obtain a 
zoning variance allowing them to construct a residence on parcel 
2. The very purpose of the division of the original parcel was 
to split off parcel 2 as a viable i u irestricted parcel on which 
Gregory could construct a residence for a beneficiary of the 
Trust. It would be practically impossible to construct a 
residence on parcel ;. after conveying the driveway to Grahns and 
granting a 15 foot easement past the driveway, in light of the 
actual dimensions of parcel 2. Granting reformation of the 
contract and conveyance of the Aesthetic easement deprives 
Gregory : the value of Parcel 2. The Trial Court's ruling is 
an i..., _r.- onable act depriving Gregory of the essential value of 
its asset. 
2. Materiality. material nature of the mistake 
regarding tiin SI/.M rf parcels and the location of the 
driveway has been set forth above, Grahns allege they were 
unaware and unconcerned with the siz$ and boundaries of parcel 2. 
It seems unlikely that someone purchasing a parcel of real estate 
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would be unconcerned with the size and boundaries of that parcel. 
Nevertheless, even if Grahns were not concerned about the size 
and boundaries, that does not stop that same issue from being a 
material consideration of the contract for Gregory, constituting 
a basis for rescission on the grounds of unilateral mistake. A 
Court of Appeals in California framed the issue this way: 
11
 [W] here rescission on the ground of mistake is considered, 
...,the outward manifestations of the parties, which resulted in 
the formation of the contract, are not controlling. As specified 
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151, Comment A, a 
party's erroneous belief fneed not be an articulated one....1 
Schultz v. County of Contra Costa. 203 Cal. Rptr. 760, 765 
(Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1984). Therefore, even if Grahns were 
completely unaware or unconcerned with the overall size of the 
original parcel or parcels 1 and 2 as divided therefrom, a 
mistake on the part of the defendant as to that issue is still 
justification for rescission of the contract on the basis of 
unilateral mistake. That mistaken belief need not have been 
articulated to the Grahns. 
3. Ordinary diligence. Gregory exercised ordinary 
diligence regarding the subdivision of property. He commissioned 
a professional to survey the property, and obtained the 
appropriate approvals from various controlling government 
agencies. Gregory has not failed in the exercise of ordinary 
diligence. The Trial Court found that the negligence of the 
surveyor is not attributable to Gregory. 
40 
4. Status quo. The Cour t cai ino t: grant relief which causes 
serious prejudice to the other party, except the loss of his 
bargain. Id , 699 F.2d at 773. Grahns have argued that the loss 
of elements of the bargain itself prevent the par ties from being 
placed in their status quo The Court below has the authority in 
equity to put the parties back in the status quo by first 
rescinding the contract, then requiring Gregory to return all 
monies paid, plus interest, pursuant -Me* contracts entered 
into based upon the mistaken, su - • rtie Court can go further to 
place the parties in the status quo by awarding damages on behalf 
of the Grahns for efforts they have put into the property before 
the mistake was presented to them Thi s Court, therefore, should 
reverse the decision of the court below and remand the case with 
instructions to that court to do so. However, the Grahns would 
then be responsible mitigation ;)t" their damages- after they 
learned of the mistake, and for compensation to Gregory for use 
of the property during the disputed period. The Grahns had not 
sold their home nor moved into the property - . six months 
after they filed this lawsuit, They should not be allowed to 
argue if Is unreasonable now for this Court to return the parties 
to the status quo. 
All the elements of rescission based on a unilateral mistake 
have been mot in this case. Although Gregory argues that this 
case should be more readily construed to be one of mutual 
mistake, both the elements of mutual and unilateral mistake 
suppor t tJ: le Def endants " right > rescission of the contract in 
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question. 
POINT IV. REFORMATION OF THE DEED WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN GRAHNS AND GREGORY WAS MERGED 
INTO THE DEED TO THE 1.11 ACRE PARCEL BY A METES 
AND BOUNDS LEGAL DESCRIPTION. 
The Utah Supreme court in the case of Dobrusky v. Isbell, 
740 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1987) held that if a deed is described in 
metes and bounds and makes no reference to a fence or road as a 
boundary line, the deed is the final repository to the agreement 
which led to its execution. Even assuming the contract of the 
sale of Parcel 1 from Gregory to the Grahns was enforceable, the 
deed became the agreement of the parties and is the only 
enforceable agreement. The parties cannot reform that to include 
additional acreage which Gregory did not intend to convey. The 
Court made a finding of fact that Gregory intended to convey 1.11 
acres which was exactly what they did. Reformation is not 
available to change the deed. 
POINT V. WHERE THE DEED REFERS TO A METES AND BOUNDS 
DESCRIPTION AND THE PARTIES MADE ORAL REFERENCE TO 
A DRIVEWAY AS THE BOUNDARY, THE METES AND BOUNDS 
DESCRIPTION PREVAILS WHERE THE TWO MEASUREMENTS 
ARE INCONSISTENT, AND REFORMATION IS IMPROPER 
In the Utah case of Neelev v. Kelsch. 600 P. 2d 979 (Utah 
1979) , parties to a sale of land disputed the ownership of land 
contained between a metes and bounds description and a road. The 
agreement was for sale of "all land north of the county road" and 
was described in a metes and bounds description. The description 
included a reference to the road. When the actual boundaries 
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were determined, the metes and bounds description did not include 
all the property to the county road or north of the county road. 
The Court resolved the controversy by holding that metes and 
bounds prevail where the two measurements are inconsistent. 
Also, on page 982 of the decision, the Court held when the face 
of the deed shows the intention was to convey a specific quantity 
of land and the metes and bounds give that quantity but a 
reference to a monument would embrace more or less than that 
quantity, the metes and bounds description should be followed. 
Gregory intended to convey a specific quantity of land and 
the Court found that was Gregory's intent. Therefore Grahns 
could not prove by clear and convincing evidence Gregory intended 
to convey more or less than 1.11 acres. Therefore reformation is 
improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Rescission, not reformation, is the appropriate equitable 
remedy in this case. Gregory has established the elements 
necessary to obtain rescission on the basis of mutual mistake. 
Grahns have failed to provide the Court with the elements 
required for reformation. 
Even if the mistake was solely that of Defendants, the 
circumstances of this case still meet the requirements for 
granting rescission on the ground of unilateral mistake. 
Equity dictates that courts will not write for the parties a 
contract which was not their intended agreement. In granting 
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reformation, the court below has improperly forced the parties 
into a contract which they did not intend to make. 
The contract was also merged into a metes and bounds 
description containing 1.11 acres and reformation is improper and 
Grahns should be left with their bargain in the form of the deed. 
Finally, where there is an inconsistency between the metes 
and bounds and a monument or road, the metes and bounds 
description prevails. 
Defendant Gregory therefore respectfully requests the court 
reverse the lower court's ruling of reformation of the contract 
and grant rescission. 
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I hereby certify that on this day of July, 1989, I 
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John S. Adams 
Taylor, Ennenga, Adams & Lowe 
Sports Mall Office Plaza 
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Russell S. Walker 
19 West South Temple, #700 
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Robert M. Taylor, #3203 
John S. Adams, #A0017 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 263-1112 
nun ntarratfj COURT 
Thwu JwUiCiui Ointrict 
\)U 1% 1988 
Ov, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE 
M. GRAHN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HEROLD GREGORY, Trustee, for 
and on behalf of the MARITAL 
AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF THE 
ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY TRUST, 
and DEAN BRADSHAW and CHRISTI 
BRADSHAW, his wife, and 
SCOTT McNEIL, an individual 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. C-86-8833 
Judge: John A. Rokich 
-oooOooo-
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable 
Judge John A. Rokich on September 24, 1987. The Plaintiffs were 
present, represented by Robert M. Taylor and John S. Adams. 
Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, and on behalf of "".he 
Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust, 
hereinafter referred to as "Trustee" was present, represented by 
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Jeffrey K. Woodbury. Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi 
Bradshaw, his wife, were present, represented by Russell S. 
Walker. Defendant Scott McNeil was present, represented by his 
counsel Allen Sims. 
The Court being fully advised in the premises and 
having rendered its oral decision and two written Memorandum 
decisions and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Reformation of the deed delivered by the Defendant 
Trustee to Plaintiffs is hereby ordered to include the Private 
Road. Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay to Trustee the sum of 
Twelve Thousand Six Hundred Four and 04/100 ($12,604.04) Dollars 
for the property in Parcel One, after reformation, in excess of 
1.11 acres. !/Interest thereon, at /O % per annum, simple 
interest, shall commence on / A ^ /-/^^ /y/i~r> / t'*/*' o& J27g/^* «^ 
2. It is hereby ordered that said reformed deed shall 
acknowledge that the fifteen foot aesthetic and geologic easement 
shall remain as agreed in the surviving provisions of the March 
18, 1986 Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement, 
which easement runs along the southeasterly side of the Private 
Road. 
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3. The sales transaction between Defendant Trustee 
and Defendant Bradshaws is hereby rescinded and, except for the 
reformation referred to hereinabove, the parties shall be placed 
in the same position as before the Bradshaw transaction. 
4. It is hereby ordered that Bradshaws'claims against 
Plaintiffs are dismissed in their entirety for no cause of 
action. 
5. It is hereby ordered that Plaintiffs'claims 
against Defendant McNeil are dismissed for no cause of action. 
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant 
Trustees'claims against Defendant McNeil are reserved and may be 
pursued in separate litigation in a future action as was 
stipulated between Defendant Trustee and Defendant McNeil. 
7. The Court does not award attorneys' fees to any of 
the parties but does award costs to the Plaintiffs against all of 
the defendants, except McNeil, in the sum of Six Hundred 
Fifty-Five and 19/100 ($655.19) Dollars. All other parties shall 
bear their own costs and fees. 
DATED this &lr3- day of g£?<?(r *"**>*^^y^ 198 £*~7 
BY THE COURT: 
v Honprable John A. Rokich 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this _lhi__ day of 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq. 
2 677 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Allen Sims, Esq. 
#8 East Broadway, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Russell S. Walker, Esq. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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Wallace R. Woodbury, #3544 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, #4172 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER 
2677 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: (801) 485-6963 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE 




HEROLD L. GREGORY, Trustee, 
for and on behalf of the 
MARITAL AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF Civil No. C-86-8833 
THE ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY 
TRUST, and DEAN BRADSHAW, an 
individual, and SCOTT McNEIL, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs, Allen R. Grahn and Josephine M. Grahn, by and 
through their attorneys of record, R. M. Taylor & Associates, P. 
C , and Defendant Dean Bradshaw by and through his attorney of 
record, Russell S. Walker, and Defendant Herold L. Gregory, 
Trustee, by and through his attorney of record, Woodbury, Bettilyon 
& Kesler, hereby enter into this Stipulation of Facts to assist the 
Court and the parties to this stipulation in resolving the issues 
relating to the outstanding Temporary Restraining Order and 
Plaintiffs1 pending Motion for a Preliminary Injunction against 
Defendant Bradshaw continued for hearing on December 15, 1986. 
For purposes of said hearing, the parties represent that they 
believe the following facts to be true and that the Court can 
accept the following facts as true in determining the issues now 
before the Court. 
1. On or about July 15, 1930, Caroline Eccles was deeded 
a parcel of property containing approximately 2.7 acres of land of 
which the subject property is a part. On or about 1961, Caroline 
Eccles (and her husband Albert) divided the property, without 
applying for subdivision approval, and conveyed two parcels 
containing approximately one-half acre each, retaining 
approximately 1.67 acres. The remaining approximately 1.67 acres 
was subsequently conveyed on or about May 17, 1978 to certain 
Marital and Family Trusts of which Herold L. Gregory is the 
trustee. At all times between 1978 and March, 1984, Defendant 
Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust, Herold 
L. Gregory, Trustee of each, owned said approximately 1.67 acre 
parcel, commonly known as 2811 Brookburn, being the address of the 
Eccles residence thereon. The subject property had at that time 
certain improvements including but not limited to a residential 
structure, a private drive also existed for the purpose of ingress 
and egress from Brookburn Road to the family residence on the 
subject property. Said drive is hereinafter referred to as the 
"Private Drive,f. Such Private Drive constituted and presently 
constitutes the only existing access to the residential structure. 
The real property has an irregular contour and is partially covered 
with scrub oak. The Private Drive follows generally the location 
of a former wagon trail used prior to 1931 to cross over the bottom 
lands and Mill Creek Stream in order to exit onto Mill Creek Road. 
The portion of the wagon trail lying north of the Mill Creek Stream 
was abandoned as an access in order to sell the two parcels sold in 
1961 as aforementioned. The existing residence was first 
constructed in 1931. 
2. Approximately two years ago the Defendant Trusts 
undertook efforts to divide the subject property to create two 
separate contiguous parcels. In this connection, Defendant McNeil 
was hired to perform certain surveying and/or engineering efforts 
in order to assist in dividing the property. Defendant McNeil was 
instructed by the Defendant Trusts through authorized 
representatives that he should create on the southeastern side of 
the property a parcel comprised of at least one-half acre, and that 
Defendant McNeil should create a legal description for said parcel 
of property, hereinafter referred to as the "Adjacent Lot". 
Defendant McNeil was instructed to survey the parcel and determine 
whether there would be a usable lot of one-half acre or more if the 
southeast side of the existing driveway were used as a boundary. 
3. During the month of June, 1984, or thereabouts, 
Defendant McNeil performed his surveying services and created a 
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survey and legal description for the Adjacent Lot dated July 10, 
1984. Such survey included a certified description purporting to 
include 0.56 acres. Defendant McNeil intended and believed that 
the legal description he created for the Adjacent Lot described a 
parcel of real property approximately 0.56 acres in size and that 
the property so described was situated south and east of the 
Private Drive, and did not include in said description any part of 
the Private Drive. 
4. During the middle of 1984, Defendant Trusts listed for 
sale the residence and adjacent lot. 
5. On July 20, 1984, Defendant Trusts conveyed the 
Adjacent Lot to Barbara Danielson for the purpose of erecting a 
house. After preparing house plans, Danielson aborted building 
project and reconveyed Adjacent Lot to Defendant Trusts on October 
4, 1985. 
6. Beginning on or about January, 1986, Plaintiffs began 
negotiations with the Defendant Trusts to purchase the existing 
residence on 1.11 acres of land. During these negotiations, 
Plaintiffs inquired of representative of the Defendant Trusts, 
Herold L. Gregory and also of his wife Mary Ethel Gregory, 
regarding the relation of the Private Drive to the property line 
between the lots- In response thereto, Plaintiffs were advised, 
inter alia, that the east side of the Private Drive was the 
dividing line between the lots (as indicated by former survey 
stakes, most of which had been removed). The said representative 
of Defendant Trusts further represented that he or his wife had 
directed the surveyor, Defendant McNeil, to create a legal 
description for the Adjacent Lot (referring to it as the half-acre 
lot), and that Defendant McNeil had prepared a survey designating a 
boundary line as the southeasterly edge of the Private Drive. 
7. The Plaintiffs relied on those representations, among 
other things, in purchasing the Brookburn Estate. 
8. On or about March 18, 1986, Plaintiffs and Defendant 
Trusts entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
Agreement for the purchase of the residence parcel as described 
therein, hereinafter referred to as "Estate", and further providing 
for (i) an option to purchase, first right of refusal, applicable 
to the Adjacent Lot, and (ii) a written restrictive aesthetic and 
geologic easement across the fifteen feet nearest the said Private 
Drive, on the Adjacent Lot, "as an aesthetic break between the 
properties as well as a geologic protection against erosion onto 
the (Estate) property". A copy of the Earnest Money Agreement in 
its entirety is attached hereto, marked Exhibit A, and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
9. As part of the aforementioned negotiations, Defendant 
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Trusts rejected a request of Plaintiffs for an affirmative covenant 
that the property had been divided in compliance with law, and 
Defendant Trusts through their trustee explained that the 
properties were described on separate tax notices, and seemed to be 
already divided by description, 
10. On or about August lf 1986f Plaintiffs and Defendant 
Trusts closed on the purchase transaction for the residence as per 
legal description attached to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase Agreement dated March 18, 1986. Plaintiffs and 
Defendant Trusts were at that time under the impression that the 
Private Drive, (excepting that portion which constitutes an 
easement over a corner of a neighboring lot which is not the 
subject of this lawsuit) was included within the parcel conveyed. 
11. Pursuant to a "First Option to Purchase" contained in 
said March 18, 1986 purchase agreement, Defendant Trusts on 
September 1, 1986, gave written notice to Plaintiffs of their 
intent to sell the Adjacent Lot to Defendant Bradshaw, and extended 
to Plaintiffs the first right of refusal to purchase same. A copy 
of the letter providing notice to the Plaintiffs is attached hereto 
and marked Exhibit B and incorporated herein by this reference. 
Plaintiffs did not exercise their right of first refusal to 
purchase the Adjacent Lot in accordance with the terms of the March 
18, 1986 Agreement and such option expired on September 8, 1986. 
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12. Defendant Bradshaw relied upon the 1984 McNeil survey 
in tendering his September lf 1986 offer which was accepted by 
Defendant Trustsf which survey indicated that the Adjacent Lot 
contained 0.56 acres of land with certain calls and dimensions 
shown on such survey to extend generally to the southeasterly line 
of the Private Drive. 
13. On or about September 3, 1986, Plaintiff Josephine M. 
Grahn telephoned the wife of Defendant Dean Bradshaw and informed 
her that Bradshaw might not be able to build on the Adjacent Lot 
inasmuch as seller had not complied with Salt Lake County 
subdivision ordinances. As a result of such phone call, Defendant 
Bradshaw related to the Defendant Trusts the conversation whereupon 
Defendant Trusts on September 5, 1986 filed a request with Salt 
Lake County Planning Commission for permission to divide the 1.67 
acre parcel into a 1.11 acre and a 0.56 acre parcel as per the 
calls and dimensions set forth on the 1984 McNeil survey and the 
1985 property tax notices, consistent with the description 
previously conveyed to Grahn. 
14. On October 11, 1986, Bradshaw discovered by 
measurement on site that the Private Drive was not located where 
indicated on the 1984 McNeil survey and as a consequence there was 
inadequate land between such driveway and the southeasterly 
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boundaries to locate the residential structure which he had 
designed for the Adjacent Lot. Bradshaw forthwith advised 
Defendant Trusts who contacted Defendant McNeil concerning the 
discovery. McNeil reviewed his survey and subsequently confirmed 
that he believed he had made an error in locating the driveway on 
the survey in that the property dimensions which he had originally 
created actually extended across the Private Drive to the boundary 
of the parcel later conveyed to Grahn; and accordingly, that the 
major portion of the Private Drive is actually within the 
description of the Adjacent Lot and not the Estate Parcel. 
15. On October 23, 1986, Defendant McNeil prepared a 
revised drawing showing what he believed to be the relationship of 
the existing drive to the Estate Parcel conveyed to Plaintiff and 
to the Adjacent Lot subsequently conveyed to Defendant Bradshaw. 
16. Inasmuch as application had been made to Salt Lake 
County based upon the 1.11 acre parcel and the 0.56 acre parcel 
Defendant Trusts awaited subdivision approval by the County which 
decision was postponed from time to time until granted on November 
19, 1986. 
17. Thereafter, on November 20, 1986, on demand of 
Defendant Bradshaw, Defendant Trusts conveyed the Adjacent Lot to 
Defendant Bradshaw as per the requirements of the September 1, 1986 
contract (Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement) 
attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
18. On November 21, 1986, Defendant Trusts, through their 
authorized representative Herold L. Gregory, informed Plaintiffs in 
writing of the survey mistake discovered, offering to Plaintiffs a 
choice of rescission due to mutual mistake, or volunteering to 
build a replacement driveway on the Estate Parcel as conveyed, as 
per letter, of a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D. No one 
informed "Plaintiffs of the problem until November 21, 1986, 
19. At no time prior to October 11, 1986 were any of the 
parties, Plaintiff or Defendant, aware of the mutual mistake or 
discrepancy in the physical location of the property line in 
relation to the Private Drive. 
20. The subject property is zoned R-l-21 in accordance 
with the zoning ordinance of Salt Lake County, Utah and in 
accordance with Section 22-14-4 of such ordinance a minimum lot 
area of not less than one-half acre is required. 
21. On or about November 23., 1986, Defendant Bradshaw 
represented to the Plaintiffs that he intended to make changes to 
the Adjacent Lot, and to break ground thereon on Monday, November 
24, 1986, which changes would affect the Private Drive, and 
further, that if Plaintiffs wished to stop him, they should 
immediately obtain an injunction. 
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22. Plaintiffs have not yet moved into the Estate 
property and d° n o t currently reside therein. 
23. The documents attached hereto as Exhibits E and F 
represent respectively the July 10, 1984 survey by Defendant McNeil 
and the October 23, 1984 drawing by Defendant McNeil as referred to 
herein. 
DATED this day of December, 1986. 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER 
By-
Wallace R. Woodbury 
R. M. TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, P. C. 
Thomas E. Lowe 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Russell Walker 
PULC-OSIM;/ 
Wallace R. Woodbury 
Utah Bar #3544 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury 
Utah Bar #4172 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Herold L. Gregory 
2677 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Telephone: (801) 485-6963 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE 
M. GRAHN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
HEROLD L. GREGORY, Trustee, 
for and on behalf of the 
MARITAL AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF 
THE ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY 
TRUST, and DEAN BRADSHAW, an 
individual, and SCOTT McNEIL, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED ANSWER AND 
CROSS-CLAIM TO AMENDED 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
OF HEROLD L. GREGORY, 
TRUSTEE, FOR AND ON BEHALF 
OF THE MARITAL AND FAMILY 
TRUSTS OF THE ALBERT ECCLES 
FAMILY TRUST 
Civil No. C-86-8833 
HEROLD L. GREGORY, Trustee 
for and on behalf of the 
Marital and Family Trusts of 




SCOTT McNEIL, an individual, 
and MCNEIL ENGINEERING, INC. 
Cross Defendants. 
CROSS-CLAIM 
Civil No. C-86-8833 
COMES NOW Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on 
I -* 
behalf of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles 
Family Trust, (hereinafter in this Answer shall be referred to as 
"Defendant") by and through his attorneys, the law firm of 
Woodbtiry, Bettilyon & Kesler, and answer Plaintiffs' Complaint 
and Counterclaims as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause of action 
upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. This Defendant, on information and belief, admits 
allegations 1, 3, 4 and 5, 
3. This Defendant admits the Trusts were formed May 17, 
1978, but denies the other allegations set forth in paragraph 2. 
4. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraphs 6 and 
7. 
5. This Defendant denies all allegations of paragraph 8, 
except that Defendant admits discussions with Plaintiffs during 
January, February and March, 1986, concerning possible purchase 
of all or part of Defendant's property. 
6. This Defendant, answering paragraph 9, denies 
allegations except Defendant admits that such a private drive 
exists and serves Defendant's property, and Defendant does not 
object to reference as a "Private Drive." 
7. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 10, 
except that Defendant admits he mentioned to Plaintiffs 
Defendant's belief that the Private Driveway was within the 
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portion of Defendant's property which included existing 
residence; and Defendant admits contracting with Defendant McNeil 
in 1984 to survey and create a legal description for a usable 
residential building site on the southeast portion of Defendants 
property. 
8. This Defendant lacks informatior from a belief as to 
allegations of paragraph 11, and therefore denies the 
allegations. 
9. This Defendant admits allegations of paragraph 12, 
except that he denies that the purpose of the alleged easement 
was to protect the Private Drive. 
10. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 13, 
except that Defendant admits closing and conveying to Plaintiffs 
on August 1, 1986, the property specifically described in the 
March 19, 1986 contract (offer dated March 1, 1986) between 
Defendant and Plaintiffs, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". 
11. This Defendant admits allegations of paragraph 14, 
except that Defendant denies any knowledge as to Plaintiff's 
reliance and therefore denies such allegation. 
12. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 15• 
13. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 16, 
except that Defendant admits asking McNeil on October 17 to 
create a "second drawing" showing generally the actual location 
of the Private Driveway in relation to parcel sold to Plaintiffs, 
which "Second Drawing" was created and dated October 23, 1986. 
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Such drawing was not a second survey. 
14. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 17. 
15. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 18, 
except Defendant admits conveying to Bradshaw on November 20, 
1986, pursuant to a sale made to Bradshaw on September 1, 1986. 
16. This Defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 19, 
except that Defendant denies that Mary Ethyl Gregory is an 
authorized representative of the Defendant. 
17. This Defendant lacks sufficient information to form a 
belief and therefore denies allegations of paragraph 20. 
18. This Defendant answers paragraphs 21, 28, 31 and 40, by 
denying and admitting as elsewhere in this answer set forth. 
19. This Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 22 
to 27 inclusive. 
20. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 29 and 30 and further affirmatively denies any 
fraudulent representations or intentional wrongdoing alleged in 
paragraphs 32 and 33. 
21. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraphs 35 
through 39 and 42. 
22. This Defendant denies allegations of paragraph 44. 
23. This Defendant lacks sufficient information to form a 
belief as to allegations of paragraph 40 and 41 and, therefore 
denies same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
24. As a separate defense, this Defendant affirmatively 
4 
alleges that there has been no intentional or negligent 
misrepresentation nor fraud of any kind on the part of this 
Defendant. 
25. This Defendant alleges that he offered his 1.67 acre 
property for sale commencing in 1984, including all or a part of 
such property. 
26. Defendant contracted on March 19, 1986, to sell 1.11 
acres of land to Plaintiffs on August 1, 1986, as per description 
specifically included as part of said Contract, and did in fact 
convey said land to Plaintiffs and otherwise closed the sale. 
27. Defendant believed that the existing Private Drive was 
located on the southeast boundary of the 1.11 acre parcel of 
property and so indicated to Plaintiffs. However, said 
representation was made upon Defendant's information and belief 
based on the July 10, 1984 survey done by a Mr. Scott McNeil. 
28. Any and all representations made by Defendant were made 
in good faith and were made with reasonable investigation and 
diligence based upon Defendant's true belief at that time. 
29. Plaintiffs considered purchasing Defendant's property 
for more than sixty (60) days and could have discovered by a 
survey the true boundaries for the 1.11 acre parcel. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
30• As a further affirmative and separate defense Defendant 
should not be held liable for any misrepresentation that resulted 
from a mutual mistake between the parties. 
31. Plaintiff, assisted by legal counsel and others, 
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investigated title of the property, perused the legal description 
as incorporated into the purchase contract and labored under the 
erroneous impression that the private driveway was on the 
southeast boundary of the described property. 
32. This constituted a mutual mistake between the parties. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
33. As a separate affirmative defense, this Defendant 
alleges Plaintiffs have purposefully and maliciously acted in bad 
faith with superior knowledge as to the legal rights of Defendant 
to divide his property and concealed from Defendant the potential 
problems involved in dividing the subject property, with intent 
that Defendant not discover the potential problems such as 
subdivision requirements. 
34. Plaintiffs are experienced in the business of property 
acquisition and may have been aware of the boundary problems and 
were aware of the zoning limitation requiring lots to contain not 
less than one-half acre. 
35. Plaintiffs hired attorneys and consultants who reviewed 
the legal descriptions, the title and the property. 
36. At no time did Plaintiffs disclose to Defendants that 
they were aware of any subdivision or boundary problems, after 
their investigations of the property. 
37. Defendant specifically referred to the adjacent lot as 
the half acre parcel in showing and offering to Plaintiffs the 
entire parcel or the 1.11 acre parcel. 
38. Plaintiffs even negotiated, as a "first right of 
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refusal", to purchase the half acre lot, and knew Defendant would 
not divide the property in such a manner as would prevent 
construction on the adjacent lot. 
39. Defendant agreed to an easement that would not have 
been given had Defendant been aware of Plaintiffs' knowledge of 
the property. 
40. Plaintiffs were purposefully trying to cause their 
contract to be enforced beyond its intent so as to deprive the 
Defendant and others of the right to use adjacent lot. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
41 • As a separate affirmative defense this Defendant 
alleges that Plaintiffs have acted with unclean hands, therefore, 
the court should equitably deny all relief to Plaintiffs pursuant 
to their claims. 
42. Plaintiff attempted to discourage potential Buyers from 
buying Defendant's remaining property (adjacent lot). Plaintiff, 
Mrs. Grahn, purposefully tried to discourage Defendant Dean 
Bradshaw from purchasing the Adjacent Lot by informing Mrs. 
Bradshaw that Bradshaw would not be able to build on the property 
because the property had not been properly subdivided. 
43. This cause of action is just a continuation of 
Plaintiffs' efforts to deprive Defendant the full use of his 
property by not purchasing it. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
44. As a further and separate affirmative defense, this 
Defendant contends the contract entered into in this Agreement is 
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voidable in that the conveyance was made in violation of the 
subdivision statutes currently existing under the laws of the 
State of Utah, and the Salt Lake County Subdivision Ordinance, 
Section 19. 
45. Plaintiffs were aware prior to the March 19, 1986 
Contrcict that division of a parcel into aggregate of three or 
more lots required prior approval of Salt Lake County, and 
Plaintiffs intentionally or negligently failed to so advise 
Defendant. 
46. Division by selling to Plaintiffs constituted dividing 
of the Defendant's property into four lots. 
47. Salt Lake County has not approved a subdivision of the 
property to permit the Private Drive to constitute the dividing 
line between Estate parcel and adjacent lot. 
48. Such a dividing line as referred to in 47 above would 
not be permitted to divide Defendant's land into two usable lots, 
as such division would violate Section 22-14-4 of Salt Lake 
County Zoning Ordinance. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
49. As an additional affirmative defense, this Defendant 
alleges that if the alleged "aesthetic easement" is maintained 
southeast of Private Drive as actually existing, it will 
constitute a restriction upon the alienation of property in that 
it renders the remaining property of Defendants completely 
unusable, and therefore unmarketable. 
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NINTH DEFENSE 
50• As a further defense, this Defendant denies each and 
every allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint not heretofore 
specifically admitted or denied. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
51. As a further separate and affirmative defense, this 
Defendant states that he has or may have further and additional 
affirmative defenses or claims which are known or not yet known 
to this Defendant, including, but not limited to, accord and 
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, estoppel, 
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow 
servant, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of 
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, failure of Plaintiffs to 
mitigate damages, unjust enrichment, and other matters 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. This Defendant 
asserts each and every affirmative defense as it may be 
ascertained through future discovery herein. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiffs' Complaint, the 
Defendant prays that Plaintiffs' Complaint against him be 
dismissed, and that Defendant receive his costs of court incurred 
herein, and such other and further relief as the court deems just 
and proper. 
COMES NOW Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on 
behalf of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles 
Family Trust, by and through his attorneys, the law firm of 
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Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler, and allege and complain against the 
Plaintiffs the Counterclaims as follows: 
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
52. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein, a 
trust organized and existing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
53. Plaintiff is, and has been at all times mentioned 
herein, a resident of Salt Lake county, State of Utah, and as of 
a date prior to January 1, 1986 was the owner of a certain parcel 
of land located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, more 
particularly described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by this 
reference incorporated hereon. 
54. On the 19th day of March, 1986, Plaintiffs and 
Defendant entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiffs agreed to 
purchase from Defendant and Defendant agreed to sell Plaintiffs 
the real property specifically described in said agreement by 
metes and bounds, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A". 
55. The legal description for said property was 
substantially the same as described on the salt Lake County Tax 
Notice,. 
56. On or about the 10th day of July, 1984, Defendant 
Gregory obtained from Scott McNeil, a licensed engineer, a 
certified survey of certain property not sold to Plaintiff 
described on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
57. The above said survey mistakenly depicted an access 
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road herein called Private Drive as being located on the 1.11 
acre property running along the alleged property line. 
58. The location of this Private Drive was made in error 
inadvertently by Mr. McNeil when preparing such survey. This 
mistake was not known to any party at the time it was made and 
was not discovered until after binding contracts of March 19, 
1986 and September 1, 1986 were respectively signed and executed 
by Defendant Gregory and by Plaintiffs and Defendant Bradshaw. 
59. On the 1st day of September, 1986, Defendant Gregory 
sold to Defendant Bradshaw the parcel of land described in 
Exhibit f,Bff for valuable consideration, subject only to 
Plaintiffs first right of refusal to purchase which was not 
exercised. 
60«, On or about the nth day of October, 1986, Defendant 
Bradshaw began laying out on adjacent lot the location of the 
home he planned to build and discovered that the location of the 
road seemed to be incorrectly shown. 
61. Defendant Gregory, upon hearing of this mistake, 
contacted Mr. Scott McNeil to determine whether an error had 
occurred. 
62. Defendant McNeil subsequently rechecked his survey on 
site and discovered that the location of the road had been placed 
inadvertently in the wrong place. McNeil prepared a new drawing 
dated October 23, showing the actual location of the road. 
63. Plaintiffs hired attorneys and consultants who reviewed 
the legal descriptions and investigated the property. Plaintiffs 
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had sufficient knowledge to alert them to the problems in 
dividing the property. 
64. Adjacent Parcel was conveyed to Defendant Bradshaw 
pursuant to a binding sales contract on the 20th day of November, 
1986, on real property described in such contract of September 1, 
1986. 
65. Since the date Defendants discovered the mistake, they 
have attempted to settle the mistake in an amicable manner. 
66. It was the intention and understanding of Plaintiffs 
and Defendant that Plaintiffs were to purchase 1.1 acres of real 
property containing the home and a private drive. However, the 
parcel description, although containing 1.11 acres of land, does 
not contain said road as set forth therein. 
67. Defendant Gregory hereby comes before the Court to have 
the contract rescinded and has offered to return to Plaintiffs 
all sums paid pursuant to the contract, in return for appropriate 
cancellations and reconveyance as a result of this inadvertent 
and mutual mistake. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
68. Defendant hereby realleges all of the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 67 as if more fully set forth 
herein by this reference. 
69. Defendant Gregory.intended to sell Plaintiffs 1.1 acres 
of real property containing a home and described on Exhibit "A". 
70. Defendant Gregory has substantially complied with the 
terms of the Sales Contract, and hereby requests the Court to 
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equitably determine that the contract has been substantially 
complied with in its terms and conditions in that it provides to 
Plaintiff all of the real property described therein and the home 
as described therein. 
71. Plaintiffs are not entitled to have any additional real 
property other than that property described on Exhibit "A". 
72. This Defendant alleges that the Private Drive described 
herein is not essential or unique to the value of the property 
described. 
73. To reform the March 19, 1986 Contract would do 
irreparable damage to Defendant Trusts and to Defendant Bradshaw 
because it would deprive each of the use of the Adjacent Lot, and 
unjustly enrich Plaintiff s, and would violate applicable 
subdivision laws. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON DEFENDANT GREGORY'S 
COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Defendant Gregory prays for judgment 
cumulatively or alternatively against Plaintiffs jointly and 
severally as indicated in either of the previous causes of action 
as follows: 
1. That the Contracts entered into by and between 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Gregory be rescinded so as to require 
all of the parties to reconvey their property and return said 
monies so as to place each of the parties in the status quo as if 
they had never sold the property; or 
2. In the alternative that the March 18, 1986 contract be 
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specifically enforced in accordance with its terms in that the 
conditions of the contract were substantially fulfilled by 
conveying the real property as adequately described therein, and 
permit Plaintiff to accept Defendant Gregory's offer to relocate 
driveway on Plaintiff;s parcel to serve the existing residential 
structure and to provide such other relief as the court deems 
equitably necessary. 
CROSS-CLAIM 
COMES NOW Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on 
behalf of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles 
Family Trust ("Defendant Trusts"), by and through his attorneys, 
the law firm of Woodbury, Bettilyon & Kesler, and allege and 
Cross-claim against Defendant Scott McNeil ("Defendant McNeil"), 
and Defendant McNeil Engineering, Inc. (Defendant Corporation) 
(collectively referred to as Defendant Engineers) as follows: 
1. Defendant Trusts between the years 1978 and March 1984 
owned the approximately 1.67 acre parcel, commonly known as 2811 
Brookburn Road, the property at issue in this action. 
2. Approximately two to three years ago, Defendant Trusts 
undertook efforts to divide the subject property to create two 
separate contiguous parcels. 
3. In connection with the above efforts, Defendant Trusts 
hired Defendant McNeil, a certified and fully licensed engineer, 
to perform certain surveying and/or engineering efforts in order 
to assist in dividing the property. 
4. The survey and/or engineering efforts were performed by 
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Defendant Scott McNeil, and employees of Defendant McNeil. 
5. Later through Defendant McNeil's attorney it was 
claimed that Defendant Corporation, a Utah corporation, performed 
the engineering services work on this project. 
6. To the best, of Plaintiffs' recollection they were 
working solely with Defendant McNeil and not Defendant 
Corporation. 
7. Defendant McNeil was instructed by Defendant Trusts 
through authorized representatives that he should create a 
usable lot of at least a one-half acre, on the southeastern side 
of the property a parcel of property, hereinafter referred to as 
the "Adjacent Lot". Said Lot was to be southeast of the existing 
driveway, if possible. 
8 During the month of June 1984, or thereabouts, 
Defendant McNeil performed his surveying and engineering services 
and created a survey and legal description for the adjacent Lot 
dated July 10, 1984. Such survey included a certified 
description purporting to include 0.56 acres of the property and 
using the southeast side of the existing driveway as a boundary. 
9 On October 11, 1986, it was discovered that the survey 
performed by Defendant McNeil was in error and that the division 
did not result in a usable lot of one-half acre or more as 
requested, nor was the southeast side of the drive included as a 
boundary line of the property. 
10. Defendant McNeil has breached the agreement with 
Defendant Trusts, breached his duty of care and negligently 
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failed to perform services as requested and as he represented he 
would do, and failed to perform a proper survey in a workmanlike 
manner. 
11. To the extent that Defendant Corporation has provided 
any work or services, Defendant Corporation breached its 
agreement, and its duty of care and has failed to perform said 
work as per agreement and in a workmanlike manner required in the 
industry. 
12. In the Complaint on file herein, it is alleged that 
Plaintiffs Allen R. Grahn and Josephine M. Grahn have been 
damaged as a result of the improper survey and their subsequent 
purchase of the property from Defendant Trusts, and that 
Defendant Trusts is liable for said injury. 
13. If Plaintiffs recover a verdict against Defendant 
Trusts for the allegations in their Complaint, such liability 
will have been brought about solely by reason of the acts of 
Defendant McNeil, and not by any actions of Defendant Trusts. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON DEFENDANT GREGORY'S 
CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT SCOTT MCNEIL 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Trusts prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendant Trusts be 
dismissed and that Defendant Trusts recover costs and attorneys 
fees expended herein from Defendant Engineers. 
2. Should Plaintiffs or any Defendants recover a verdict 
against Defendant Trusts, or Defendant Trust be monetarily 
damaged in any manner, that Defendant Trusts have judgment over 
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and against Defendant Scott McNeil for the same amount of such 
verdict or damages, as the case may be, together with costs. 
3. Should Plaintiffs recover a verdict against Defendant 
Trusts that Defendant Trusts have judgment over and against 
Defendant McNeil Engineering, Inc., for the same amount, together 
with costs. 
4 For any other valuable and good consideration as the 
Court deems necessary. 
DATED this ^7 day of
 m . 1987. 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER 
y K. Woodbury 
ney for Cross-Cqafpl^inant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that on the day of , 1987, I 
personally mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer 
and Counterclaim to Thomas E. Lowe, an attorney for Plaintiffs, 
and a copy to Russell S. Walker, attorney for Defendant Bradshaw 
by U. S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid at the following 
address: 
Thomas E. Lowe 
John S. Adams 
Robert M. Taylor 
5525 South 900 east, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Russell S. Walker 
50 South Main Street, #2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
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Allen Sims, Esq. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Defendant, Scott McNeil 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
M. GRAHN, husband and wife, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, CIVIL NO. C-86-8833 
vs. 
HEROLD GREGORY, Trustee, for 
and on behalf of the MARITAL : 
AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF THE ALBERT 
ECCLES FAMILY TRUST, and DEAN : 
BRADSHAW and CHRISTI BRADSHAW, 
his wife, and SCOTT McNEIL, : 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich on September 24, 1987. The plaintiffs were present, and 
represented by Robert M. Taylor and John S. Adams. Defendant 
Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, and on behalf of the Marital and 
Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust, hereinafter 
referred to as "trustee" was present, and represented by Jeffrey 
K. Woodbury. Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi Bradshaw, his 
wife, were present, and represented by Russell S. Walker. 
Defendant Scott McNeil was present, and represented by his 
counsel Allen Sims. 
The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, admitted 
documentary evidence, viewed the property which was the subject 
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matter of this litigation, read the Memoranda on file herein, 
heard oral arguments, and then took the matter under advisement 
pending the receipt of supplemental Memoranda. The Court 
received the supplemental Memoranda, reviewed the file, its 
notes, the Memoranda on file and the documentary evidence. 
The Court made inquiries from time to time as to the status 
of this matter. The Court was advised that the parties were 
attempting to negotiate a settlement. The Court finally called 
plaintiffs1 counsel and requested that this matter be noticed up 
for hearing and that their clients be present. The hearing was 
not held because of the illness of one of the attorneys. The 
Court was advised that the parties could not enter into a 
settlement agreement, nor agree upon Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The Court advised counsel it could prepare 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law so that this case can be 
concluded at least on the District Court level and the parties 
can take whatever action they deem appropriate. 
The Court held a hearing on November 10, 1988 for the 
purpose of reviewing the status of this case with counsel and 
their clients. The Court explained to counsel and the litigants 
that the Court is not the reason for the delay in the resolution 
of this case. The delay is the result of settlement negotiations 
and the parties being unable to agree upon the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. Since the parties could not agree, the 
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Court, upon its own initiative, prepared Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in accordance with its Memorandum Decision* 
The Court submitted its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to counsel for review. Counsel have filed objections to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court took notice 
of the objections and modified or corrected paragraph 20 of the 
Findings of Fact and paragraphs 2, 4 and 9 of the Conclusions of 
Law. 
The Court now being fully advised in the premises and having 
rendered its oral decision and two written Memorandum Decisions, 
now makes the following final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs are and were at all relevant times residents 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. The defendant Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert 
Eccles Family Trust, Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, are owners of 
certain real property located at approximately 2811 East 
Brookburn Road, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi Bradshaw are 
individuals residing in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Scott McNeil is an individual residing in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
^?, 
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5. The real property owned by the defendant trusts was 
listed for sale. The real property listed, after negotiation for 
the sale and purchase thereof was divided into two parcels. At 
the time of trial the Court designated for identification 
purposes the two parcels as Parcel One and Parcel Two. 
6. Trustee represented to the plaintiffs that the 
southeasterly edge of the road was the boundary between Parcel 
One and Parcel Two, and that a 15 foot aesthetic easement along 
the southeasterly edge of the private road was to be included if 
and when trustee sold Parcel Two. 
7# The private road provided ingress and egress to Parcel 
One. 
8. Trustee did engage defendant McNeil to survey a one-
half acre lot on the southeasterly side of the private roadway 
for a building lot for Barbara Danielson. The Court designated 
said lot as Parcel Two. 
9. Plaintiffs and trustee entered into an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One (including 
the private road) on March 18, 1986, which transaction was closed 
on August 1, 198 6. 
10. Defendants Bradshaws and trustee entered into an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for the 
purchase of Parcel Two. The legal description used for Parcel 
Two had been prepared by defendant McNeil. 
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11. The Earnest Money Agreement entered into by defendants 
Bradshaws and trustee provided, among other things, that 
plaintiffs Grahns had first right of refusal to purchase Parcel 
Two. 
12• Trustee thereafter offered plaintiffs a first right of 
refusal to purchase Parcel Two which was not exercised by 
plaintiffs. 
13. The description to Parcel One was obtained by 
plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt Lake County Recorders Office. The 
description designated Parcel One as being 1.11 acres and 
accepted by the trustee and defendants Grahn as acreage to be 
sold and purchased. 
14. Plaintiffs Grahn and trustee understood that the 
southeasterly edge of the road was to be the boundary and the 
technical description did not conform to the intent of the 
plaintiffs Grahn and trustee. 
15. Plaintiffs Grahn, by including the road in Parcel One 
received in excess of l.li acres of land. 
16. At the time defendants Bradshaw executed the Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One, 
they did not rely upon the survey as describing the boundaries, 
but upon the physical boundary, the southeasterly side of the 
private roadway. 
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17. The defendants Bradshaw did rely upon the reference 
made by defendant McNeil that Parcel Two contained .5 acres. 
18. The defendants Bradshaw needed .5 acres in order to 
obtain a building permit from the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission. 
19. If Parcel Two did not contain .5 acres, defendant 
Bradshaws could terminate the agreement and trustee refund the 
purchase price. 
20. Prior to defendants Bradshaws closing on the purchase 
of Parcel Two, trustee discovered that the McNeil survey was in 
error and the remapping of the survey of Parcel Two by defendant 
McNeil showed that a portion of the private road was contained in 
Parcel Two. 
21. Defendants Bradshaw did not have an enforceable 
agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories. 
22. The legal description contemplated to be used for 
Parcel Two was in error and did not conform with the intent of 
the parties, that Parcel Two has located on the southeasterly 
edge of the private road. 
23. Plaintiffs did not rely upon defendant McNeil's survey 
of Parcel Two and were owed no duty by defendant McNeil. 
24. The Court makes no finding as to the trustee's claim 
against McNeil at this time because counsel for trustee and 
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McNeil have advised the Court that this issue may be resolved by 
a stipulation betv/een those parties. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The deed between trustee and plaintiffs should be 
reformed to include the private roadway as Parcel One and 
plaintiffs should pay for the excess acreage. 
2. Plaintiffs Grahn and trustee stipulate that $12,604.04 
represents a fair value of the ground in excess of 1.11 acres. 
Interest shall be paid on the $12,604.06 commencing on a date 
determined by the Court. 
3. The reformed deed shall also acknowledge that the 
fifteen (15) foot aesthetic and geologic easement shall remain as 
agreed in the surviving provisions of the March 18, 1986 Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement, which easement 
runs along the southeasterly side of the private road. 
4. Defendant Bradshaws are not bona fide purchasers and 
therefore not entitled to specifically enforce the agreement for 
the purchase of Parcel Two, and except for the reformation 
referred to hereinabove, the parties shall be placed in the same 
position as before the Bradshaw transaction. 
<TPr 
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5. The transaction between trustee and defendants Bradshaw 
should be rescinded. 
6. Bradshaws have no cause of action against plaintiffs 
for the alleged prevention by injunction of the building of their 
home on Parcel Two. 
7. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant 
McNeil for the erroneous first survey completed with respect to 
Parcel Two. 
8. The defendant trusteefs claims against defendant McNeil 
may be pursued in separate litigation in a future action as 
provided by stipulation between defendant trustee and defendant 
McNeil. 
9. The Court does not award attorney's fees to any of the 
parties, but does award costs to the plaintiffs against all 
defendants except defendant McNeil. All other parties must bear 
their own costs and fees. 
Dated this <-*L day of Decemberf 1988. 
qOHtf A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
&11 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage 
0 
prepaid, to the following, this ^2 **^ day of December, 1988: 
Robert M. Taylor 
John S. Adams 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq. 
2677 E. Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Allen Sims, Esq. 
#8 E* Broadway, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Russell S. Walker, Esq. 
50 S. Main, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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I EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
nd ; Yes(XL / N o ( O ) EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
^ .
 j o ^ l l e h ' R . G're.hn and% !Josephihe" 'M. Orahn * u ,_ • .uo , 
ie undersigned Buyer _ ^ _ ; ; hereby deposits with Brokerage 
ERNEST MONEY, the amount of P i v v V n m f i r ^ f " : ; > p r l 0 0 / I Q Q . „ nniiar* ($ - n P - ^ r , ), 
ie form of L " r M P T T ^ < " ° ; P ^ " ' ^ . O h o r V p n f f i f - p r < n n n n uuhirh shall be deposited in accordance with
 3Dplicable State Law. 
acceptance ~^*.y? f „..^ ^ ^ .. '' 
srage ^ .s Phone Number ; ,s' 
OFFER'TO PURCHASE 
/ 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at •' 
V ' r o o l - i j l i r n '
 i n t n e City of > ' . ^ 1 t . l , : * V e County of ' ' "" :' ••" " ' Utah. 
»ct to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer 
cordance with Section G. Said property is more particularly described as: T i i Q ^ - 1 ^ -^m-r t **> •• . - > - ' • « • , - . - ^ , - , - • . » • . . ' • • . • 
• . ;« 1 / * ,* 4 f -»• -j r^ \' 1 • ••-. ^ n f - ? ' f 7<-*-- •? *-, -j h , " i h K ' l ? ' , h p H 1->r ,T~ r>T- r\ r r : ' -i
 f-. r * ' ' - > - - > , ; • ; • • - • i ' ' - | ' 7 
HECK APPLICABLE BOXES: :;.. \ . : 
3 UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY C^Vacant Lot 0,Vacant Acreage QjOther 
^IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY [^Commercial.. . Presidential CjCondo Q Other 
(a) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: ' • '' : ' r ' ' 
* — r- r' r> 
(b) ..Excluded items. .The following items are specifically excluded from this «»!«»• "•» *M i *-»•*:* n nr>-*-
nn^v (*"> ) H ' ^ n v n '-•* r ^ P V P I I T ' 1 ^ ^ •Fvrvr ' { V- i c\ *?;• 1 
*(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
^public sewer Connected _ . Owell Qconnected (pother O electricity Q connected 
D septic tank (^connected [^irrigation water/secondary system Congress & egress by private easement 
3 pthef sanitary system _ _ _ _ "1 * «f «han»c • "3 * ^ ftmpiiny > * Q J ; ^ ; «•; Q dedicated road O paved , 
Qpublic water . Qconnected •*-• QTV antenna /< Qtpaster antenna Q p r e w i r e o M - C - Ocurb and gutter 
0 private water Qconnected • • - . . - Dvnatural gas Qconnected Qother rights 
(d) Survey. A-certified survey. O^hall be furnished at the expense <** - : prior to closing. Q shad not be furnishefl 
(e) Buyer Inspection. - Buyer has made'a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physica 
condition, except: ""? O ^vV- farv t - i r\*iz ilr^s^rn'r
 f n f f p r j_s r v ; ' , ' r - - ' - ^ \' r-p~," -i >- -^  ->^---"—•--•-- _^ 
f n c p p r f r n n - ' K y P n v p r V.fS-hV-.^ n f*AAv* ( 1 0 ) n a v e j r-i n -^ t-»•.- ,~ 1 p <~ •?»'•'• 4 —-^  ' " • " ^ •• -• *-•.-!• . 
^exis t ing survey ""acceptable ' ' '* ' '" , s t a n t i a l change or J o s s .has .occur. 
!. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING..; The total purchase price.for the property is ? ^ > p — ^ • / - r--- ' r ^ ^ : l "'• • • : " — L J _ L — ^ — : 
r / 1 r-O '.. .... - * - :'"':" '." _ ^ r l n n l l a r g ($ " JJp .5 /] r ^ ^ C - C L f / . • A) which shall be paid'as follows 
• ? 0 0 , n 0 which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: ^ /J' ^ 7 72.-SO ' 0' 
^Q^^gjD-gL^-Q ^Representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. ''' 
^ ^ -7 •?. <v^T*pr»«ttnting the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumes 
'2. • ^fD, DY buyer., which obligation bears interest at ' % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
t/ * which include: Qprincipal; Ointerest; Dtaxes; Oinsurance; Dcondo fees; Dother 
Representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to b« 
. •• ... . * assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at - % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
: ; . . . "': .. which include: Qprincipal;. Dinterest; Dtaxes; Dinsurance;. Dcondo fees; Dother 
!. 1 5 , ?'? C' , Q.">prft<wnting balance, j / any; jncluding prnrnari*;fjnm a n f t w , r ; ; ^ - ; ; ; ; ; , ; ; ; ; l f ^ n to be paid as follows: : \ 1:—•—i_l: 
1 - , - . 1 
- * - - • I 
D t h o r ^ /-» f 
r , A n-« 
. i -J . 
*• 
j 
- . , , 
^ • i . i . 
... . . . i . . 
»*i i .-•« ^ 
-\ A <~~ 
1
 i f 





/ • f ^ f ( 1 0 0 .1 ; f t^ tAL PURCHASEPRICE 
-^i^  
f Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procure same and th« 
r is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees to make application within 
> after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed . 
uyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within * ' ' * naff; after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidabi-
ie option of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice. K j j ) * 
Seller agrees to pay $ towards Buyer's total financing and;closing costs, including, but not limited to. loan discount points. 
If this Agreement involves the assumption of an existing loan or obligation on the property, Section F shall apply. ^ 
C M H I M C O I i V I U r U C T O M L C ' O M U t t C C i V l C I M I 
legend Yes (X) Mo (0) 




A. INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property: pi 
heating, air-conditioning and ^ntiiating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures curtains and c 
and rods, window and door sceens. storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets water softener automatic gar? 
opener and transmitter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs. 
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer'1; own examination and judgment am 
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location present value, future value 
herefrom or as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyet 
any additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the proper! 
has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, hens or other encurr 
cf any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and ap 
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. 
D. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers knowledge, provided an adequate s 
water and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is. to the best of Seller's knowiedge. in good working o« 
Seller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to 
Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts ag3»nst the property req 
consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and /or declare the entire balance du 
event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after r 
nonwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and v c d by giving wntte 
to Seller or Seller's agent. In such case, ail earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood one agreed that if pr 
for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void 
G. TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3\ days prior to closmc 
shall have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion, or n preliminary title reoort on the subject p 
Buyer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept, Buyer shall give w-t ten nonce thereof ' 
or Sellers agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title Thereafter, Seller shall be requited, through ov.r-.v at closing, to • 
defect(s) to which Buyer has obiected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shali no 'Mil and void at t^ .-
of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H. TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard f c 
policy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be 'ssued shai! cont ra no exceptions o r 
those provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If t.tle cannot !;r ~ade so insurable 
an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to 2uver. and this As 
shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge. 
!. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no ater than fifteen •* 
after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a .copy of all existing leases (and any arrenuments thcretc -: 
the property- Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within three (3) working days thereafter. Buyer sha'i take title i<ih|pc: 
leases, if objection is not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
J CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency cr this Agreement Sailer agrees that no changes -r any ex is t - ' ; vases shs;! oe —-
raw ieases entered into r.c sha!l anv sur-startial alterations or Tvjrov-r.nierMs be made or under'aken v rhou : :ne v - : r co:*sr;n< o' t •-. 3 .-:>-r 
fin hrn,.nhi «•> n i w ^ t / v n ^ ' g opinion,(Sfttt,Sftfttinn H) S?(f £*\hibi7 A j ^>; <•• (%£• 
< ? t. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accord*flC0,with Section G. Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing. 
eKs^alWafceClftte^bJect t o ; « t ^ ^ not-reviewed/any-condo* 
iunr^cCA>BH;pc«w:wxigroDs:jbis:^gfeem$DK-
5. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vesCirt. Buyer as follows: . M 1 f » n t> r m h r r>r-.n J r v - . - ' v i n r • ' , f > - v . v . r ^ j r , +• u,- t 
5. SELLER WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:_lLll r- 1 > \- T *, r c H r*. T ; n •: 
>reun'dcr is legally divided nnd separate fror? tno ^-ioi.nirv l^t M r:* , .* ; .v- • >^i 
iriti?nga4iafi^&9nrf^AA, Afi.iTff. h&ffiMftfo m g J L & ^ i n c 6 " C o n i n e r c c o ; 
7. ^SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and /or contingencies which must 
tatisfied prior to closing: >"«afev T . ^ - M ^ i f - ;» ' 
3.' CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or.before ' a rrirrr] c»+» T
 t"\ 9 ' J 1 £ _ at a reasonable location to be designated by 
er, subject to Section Q. Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance 
i this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R, shall be made as of QQla.te7pj<possessionEJjrtate"of closing Q-other- ,
 : 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on ' ^'^ " ^ t l 1 , ,*. - c- ,m|p«.<; extended by written agreement of parties. 
10. GENERAL PROVISIONS. Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
eement by refe^ehce. . _ 
1 1. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seiler 
I have until /&' ' ' * (AM-/ffri]fr />? /n *~ H f^/? , 1 9 * '-> , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the 
INEST MONEY to the Buyer. W ,
 J . ^ /J / . . . . ' r 
' Date ^Tgnature;of Buyt 
/ -
lature of Buyer t  £ignature;bf er Date 
•CKONE 
CCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
EJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer. (Seller's Initials) 
OtJNTER' OFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO. the ^ exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
resents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have, until • • • •• (A.M./P.M.) . 19 to accept the terms 
aerified below. 
3 
e (AM-PM) - ; 
Signature of Seller Signature of Seiler 
:CK ONE: 
uyer accepts the counter o,ffer 
uyer accepts with modifications on attached addendum 
s ; j 
(AM-PM1 " * Signature of Buyer Signature of Buyer 
COMMISSION. The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to: / * ° — "*> ' '^/7T , : •— — (Brokerage) 
• C -7*-T 
fmmisSion nf /Z *' / ' ' » • . • - . - * . - . a<; consideration for the efforts in procuring a buyer 
lature of Seller *" v Date Signature of Seller _ . Date 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing ail signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore 
:ompleted). 
(V Q l acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
NATURE OP SEILER - „, ^ SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
« ^ _ — < _ — . . _. 
Date f ... . , S'.- " > Date 
Date - Date 
B. D l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on _ — , 19 by 
tified Mai! and return receipt attached hereto to the O Seller a Buyer. Sent by — _ — — 
\ ''. * 
|e three of a four page form Seller's Initials ( ? v. )-( ) Date __2 : \ '. Buyer's Initials ( ) ( . ) Date ZJ. 
K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership trust. ^st3te. or other entity, the'person exe:ui\,V<j :h,s Agreemcn 
behalf wB//ants.his or her authority to do bo and to bind Buyer or Seller . 
L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the c-ntiu.* Agreement between the parffes and supoisec 
cancels rrny or d arl prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between tin; poitu'»«. There are no verbal agreements which 
or affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed f»xc*pt by mutual written agreement of 'he partes 
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be.in writ ing and% .f attached hereto, shall mcnrpur.itu oil the provisions 
AgronVicnt not expressly modified or excluded therein. 
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the tamest money as hqi 
damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of .Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction 
express condition 01 contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue.of any default by Buyer), the earnest money < 
shall be returned to Buyer Both parties agree that, should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained tha defaulting pari 
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee. which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursui 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the • 
money deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and 
authorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The i 
of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buy**, and-Seller further agree that the-def 
party shall pay tftetcourtcosts and reasonable attorney's fees-incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action*. 
0 . ABROGATION. Execution of a final real estate contract, if any, shall abrogate this Agreement. 
P. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the pi 
between the date hereof and ••••e date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall 
ten percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may, at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to re 
replace damaged propcrty (prior to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent ( l U /o) of the purchas 
and Seller agrees in writ ing to opair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as i 
Q. TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date providedjierein due to interruption of trai 
strikes, fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of 8uyer or Seller, then the closing dai 
be extended seven (7) days bevond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thei 
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing date. "C los ing" shall mean the date on which ail necessary instruments are 
and delivered by all parties to the transaction. *• 
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half ( 1 / 2 ) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution 
of providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the 
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shalhbe prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other re 
shall be assigned to Buyer at closing. 
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects othe 
those excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (?.) 
warranty deed, containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporati 
said existing real estate contract therein. 
T. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller. 
U. BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "Brokerage shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate 
V. DAYS. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days " shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays. 
PAGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE C O M M I 
ECCLES, CAROLINE T r• (TR)' 
2811 E BROOKBURN RD 
SLC, UT 84109 
Property descript ion and locat ion: 
BEG 25 RDS S & 942 FT E FR NV COR SEC 35 T IS 
R IE SL MER E 5-58 FT S 220 FT M OR L TO CEN OF 
MILL CREEK E'LY & SE•LY ALG SD CREEK 8 9 . 2 2 FTtf 
S 6 4 . 6 FT; S'LY ALG CURVE TO R 3 8 . 4 5 FT; 
S 2 8 ° 1 5 ' 2 9 " W 4 9 . 5 5 FT; SV ' LY ALG CURVE TO R 
8 3 . 0 1 5 FT; S 8 4 . 7 7 FT; V 1 0 2 . 1 2 5 FT; N 555 FT M 
OR L TO CEN OF MILL CREEK; SE'LY ALG SD CEN LI 
TO A FT S FR BEG; N 2 2 0 FT M OR L TO 
EXHIBIT A 
T h i s E x h i b i t s h a l l s e r v e a s an addendum s t a t i n g 
a d d i t i o n a l t e r m s o f t h a t o f f e r t o p u r c h a s e i n t h e a t t a c h e d 
E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t d a t e d siai-th / g? , 1 9 8 6 , 
o f f e r e d by A l l e n R. Grahn and J o s e p h i n e M. Grahn, i d e n t i f i e d 
t h e r e i n a s Buyer . ( I t i s t h e s e c o n d s u c h a t t a c h m e n t . That 
p r e v i o u s E x h i b i t i s s u p e r s e d e d h e r e b y and s h a l l h a v e no 
f u r t h e r f o r c e or e f f e c t . The a t t a c h e d A g r e e m e n t , w i t h t h i s 
E x h i b i t , s h a l l , form t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s ; 
i t b e i n g a c k n o w l e d g e d by B u y e r t h a t t h e o f f e r e x p i r a t i o n 
d a t e was e x t e n d e d , and t h a t t h i s E x h i b i t r e f l e c t s n e g o t i a t e d 
a m e n d m e n t s t o B u y e r ' s o f f e r . ) The t e r m s h e r e o f a r e h e r e b y 
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e s a i d A g r e e m e n t , a s i f m o r e f u l l y s e t 
f o r t h t h e r e i n . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t a n y o f t h e t e r m s h e r e o f 
a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t e r m s of t h e s a i d A g r e e m e n t , t h e 
t e r m s of t h i s E x h i b i t s h a l l c o n t r o l . O t h e r w i s e , a l l o t h e r 
t e r m s o f t h e a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t s h a l l 
r e m a i n t h e same . 
A. W i t h r e s p e c t t o p a r a g r a p h * 1 ( e ) , i t i s 
u n d e r s t o o d and a g r e e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d t h a t B u y e r s 1 
i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y i s s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f 
d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y h a s n o t b e e n s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
harmed or o t h e r w i s e l o s t v a l u e p r i o r t o c l o s i n g due to such 
t h i n g s a s , by way of e x a m p l e , w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n i n t e n d e d , 
v a n d a l i s m , f i r e , a c t s o f G o d , or o t h e r c a u s e s f o r w h i c h 
S e l l e r a s s u m e s t h e r i s k . 
B. The b a l a n c e o f $ 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 w h i c h i s r e f e r r e d 
in PARAGRAPH 2 of t h e a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t 
s h a l l b e p a i d a s f o l l o w s : s u b j e c t t o t h e t e r m s a n d 
c o n d i t i o n s of a s t a n d a r d l o n g form T r u s t Deed and T r u s t Deed 
N o t e p r o v i d i n g f o r i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e o f 9% p e r annum on 
t h e p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e , and p a y m e n t s o f i n t e r e s t o n l y on a 
m o n t h l y b a s i s i n t h e a m o u n t o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 8 6 3 . 0 0 p e r 
m o n t h , and a b a l l o o n payment of t h e t o t a l amount due p a y a b l e 
on or b e f o r e t h e f i f t h a n n i v e r s a r y d a t e of t h e d a t e of 
c l o s i n g , and f u r t h e r p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e s a i d a m o u n t m a y b e 
p a i d at. any t i m e p r i o r to c l o s i n g w i t h o u t p r e p a y m e n t p e n a l t y 
o f a n y s o r t . In a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o , an a d d e n d u m s h a l l b e 
p l a c e d w i t h t h e U t a h l o n g f o r m T r u s t Deed t o p r o v i d e a s 
f o l l o w s : 
No s a l e o f t h e p r o p e r t y w h i c h i s t h e s ' u b j e c t of 
t h i s T r u s t Deed, or any p a r t t h e r o f , s h a l l be p e r m i t t e d 
u n t i l t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s s e c u r e d by t h i s T r u s t Deed i s 
r e p a i d in f u l l , a n d , i n t h e e v e n t of s u c h a s a l e p r i o r 
t o s u c h r e p a y m e n t in f u l l , t h e o b l i g a t i o n s e c u r e d 
h e r e b y s h a l l be i n d e f a u l t a n d t h e e n t i r e p r i n c i p a l 
b a l a n c e and i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n s h a l l b e c o m e i m m e d i a t e l y 
1 
d u e and p a y a b l e , a t t h e o p t i o n of t h e b e n e f i c i a r y o f 
t h i s T r u s t Deed, wh ich o p t i o n s h a l l be e x e r c i s e d w i t h i n 
f o r t y - f i v e (45) d a y s o f n o t i c e o f t h e s a i d s a l e t o t h e 
s a i d b e n e f i c i a r y . 
C. As r e f e r r e d t o i n PARAGRAPH 7 o f t h e a t t a c h e d 
E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t , t h e o f f e r i s s p e c i f i c a l l y 
s u b j e c t t o t h e f o l l o w i n g s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s a n d / o r 
c o n t i n g e n c i e s wh ich must be s a t i s f i e d p r i o r to c l o s i n g : 
i . T h i s o f f e r i s s u b j e c t t o B u y e r s s e l l i n g 
and c l o s i n g on t h e s a l e o f t h e i r home l o c a t e d a t 3 7 3 5 
E m i g r a t i o n Canyon p r i o r t o t h e c l o s i n g on t h e s a l e 
w h i c h i s * t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s A g r e e m e n t . P r o v i d e d , 
h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e S e l l e r may c o n t i n u e t o o f f e r t h e 
p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d h e r e i n f o r s a l e and t o c o n s i d e r 
o f f e r s t o p u r c h a s e t h e s a m e , s u b j e c t t o B u y e r s 1 f i r s t 
r i g h t o f r e f u s a l . S h o u l d S e l l e r r e c e i v e an o f f e r 
a g a i n s t t h e p r o p e r t y w h i c h S e l l e r d e s i r e s t o a c c e p t , 
t h e n S e l l e r s h a l l h a v e t h e d u t y t o g i v e n o t i c e t h e r e o f 
t o B u y e r , w h i c h n o t i c e s h a l l b e a c c o m p a n i e d by a c o p y 
o f t h e o f f e r a n d / o r o t h e r a c c e p t a b l e p r o o f t h a t a 
bona f i d e w r i t t e n o f f e r h a s b e e n r e c e i v e d by t h e 
S e l l e r . S e l l e r s h a l l r e p r e s e n t , i n c o n n e c t i o n 
t h e r e w i t h , t h a t S e l l e r d e s i r e s t o a c c e p t t h e s a i d 
o f f e r , s u b j e c t t o B u y e r s ' f i r s t r i g h t o f r e f u s a l . Prom 
• t h e d a t e o f r e c e i p t o f s a i d n o t i c e , B u y e r s h a l l h a v e 
s e v e n (7) d a y s w i t h i n w h i c h t o g i v e n o t i c e t o t h e 
S e l l e r , i n w r i t i n g , " o f B u y e r s ' w a i v e r of t h e a f o r e s a i d 
c o n d i t i o n t h a t B u y e r s 1 home be s o l d and c l o s e d p r i o r , t o 
c l o s i n g on Buyers 1 p u r c h a s e h e r e u n d e r . T h e r e u p o n , .the 
s a i d o f f e r o f w h i c h S e l l e r g a v e B u y e r n o t i c e s h a l l 
f a i l , and Buyer and S e l l e r s h a l l c l o s e the s a l e c a l l e d 
f o r i n t h i s A g r e e m e n t w i t h i n s i x t y (60) d a y s o f t h e 
d a t e o f t h e s a i d n o t i c e a t a r e a s o n a b l e l o c a t i o n 
d e s i g n a t e d by t h e S e l l e r . The s a i d s a l e s h a l l t a k e 
p l a c e p u r s u a n t t o and u n d e r t h e t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s 
s e t f o r t h i n t h i s o f f e r , e x c e p t t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t 
p a y m e n t s c a l l e d for under t h e T r u s t Deed N o t e s h a l l n o t 
c o m m e n c e f o r a p e r i o d l e s s t h a n f o r t y - f i v e (45) c l ays 
from t h e d a t e of c l o s i n g . Should Buyer f a i l to remove 
t h e s a i d c o n t i n g e n c y r e g a r d i n g t h e s a l e of B u y e r s ' home 
i n E m i g r a t i o n C a n y o n , t h e n t h i s A g r e e m e n t s h a l l f a i l 
f o r f a i l u r e t o s a t i s f y t h i s c o n t i n g e n c y and t h e e a r n e s t 
m o n e y d e p o s i t m a d e by B u y e r s h e r e u n d e r s h a l l b o 
refunded, in f u l l . 
i i . T h i s o f f e r i s f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n e d upon 
t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y b e i n g f r e e o f u n r e a s o n a b l y 
r e s t r i c t i v e e a s e m e n t s o r r i g h t s of way i n f a v o r of 
o t h e r s . B u y e r s h a l l b e d e l i v e r e d t h e p o l i c y of t i t l e 
i n s u r a n c e , or t h e p r e l i m i n a r y r e p o r t t h e r e t o , a t l e a s t 
f i v e d a y s p r i o r t o s c h e d u l e d c l o s i n g ; a n d B u y e r s h a l l 
n o t i f y S e l l e r p r i o r t o c l o s i n g o f -any b u r d e n s w h i c h 
i 
exist which cause this condition not to be satisfied, 
closing shall be postponed, and Seller shall have ten 
days from receipt of such notice to satisfy the subject 
condition by removal of the burden(s) or other 
adjustment acceptable to Buyer. 
iii. This offer is further conditioned upon Buyer 
confirming the existence of a right of way or easement 
across that roadway leading to the property which has 
been identified as being part of the adjoining property 
of O.C. Tanner. The purpose of this condition is to 
satisfy the requirement of Buyers that reasonable 
access to the property be thus available. Seller does 
not warrant the existence of such right of way or 
easement. 
D. In addition to the foregoing, th'e following 
conditions and terms are set forth herein as part of the 
consideration for the attached Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, of which this Exhibit is a part. 
With respect to the one-half acre lot adjoining 
the lot which is the subject of this Agreement, Seller 
hereby grants to Buyer the first option to purchase the said 
half acre lot. Seller agrees that, should Seller receive an 
offer from any third party to purchase the said adjoining 
half acre lot, Which Seller desires to accept, Seller shall 
give notice of that desire, in writing, to the Buyer, along 
with a copy of the said offer and, if required by Buyer, 
other proof that Seller has received a bona fide offer to 
purchase the said property. The said notice shall indicate 
and/or be deemed, pursuant to this Agreement, to be an offer 
by Seller to sell the property to Buyer under the same terms 
and conditions as those set forth in the said written offer, 
attached to the notice. Buyer shall have seven (7) days 
within which to accept the said offer by giving Seller 
written notice of Buyers1 desire to purchase under the said 
terms and conditions. Should Buyer fail to exercise Buyers' 
option under this provision, then Seller shall have the 
right to sell the property within ninety (90) days of the 
date of the expiration of Sellers* said option on terms and 
conditions no more favorable than those originally offered 
under this paragraph to Buyer. Should the offer be amended 
making the terms more favorable, or should the said offer 
fail and a new offer be received, then the said a mend merit: or 
offer shall be, once again, subject to the terms of this 
provision. The terms of this provision shall survive the 
closing of the purchase of the property which -is the subject 
of the main Agreement. 
Should Seller sell the adjoining one-half 
acre lot to any third party after Buyers' failure to 
purchase the same under the terms of the next 
preceeding paragraph, Seller further agrees hereby to 
grant an easement <~\n<:\ restrictive covenant, in favor of 
3 
the o w i i e i: s o £ t h e 1 a i: i d !' w 1: i i c 1: :i i s 11 \ e s ~ - _. .... ,. - - . . i 
m a i n a g r e e m e n t , which covenant shall run with the land, 
to wjl__t_£ a r e q u i r e m e n t that the t r e e s and b r u s h not be 
removed (Acts of God removing or nece s s i t a t i n g removal 
• of the s a m e e x c e p t e d ) f r o m the o n e - h a l f a c r e lot f r o m 
any p o i n t w i t h i n f i f t e e n {I 5) f e e t of the e x i s t i n g 
drive which separates the two lots, it being understood 
that the said t r e e s a n d b r u s h e £ £ e c t i v e l y s e r v e as a n 
asthetic break between the p r o p e r t i e s , as well as a 
geologic protection against erosion onto the property 
which is* the subject of the main agreement. Should 
such trees and/or brush be removed as a result of an 
act of God, the owner of the benefitted property shall 
have t h e r i g h t:, b \ I t: i: i < ::»I : d i :i t y, t o r e - p 1 a n t t h e protect e d 
are a . 
E W i t h r e s p e c t t o p a r a g r a p h 3 . o f t h e a t t a c h e d , 
i t i s a g r e e d t h a t S e l l e r s h a l l e v i d e n c e t h e t i t l e t o t h e 
p r o p e r t y ( p r o v i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h a t 
s e c t i o n , a m o n g o t h e r s ) b y a c u r r e n t p o l i c y o f t i t l e 
i n s u r a n c e in t h e a m o u n t of t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e , and n o t 1 D y a n 
a b s t r a c t . S e e , a l s o G e n e r a l P r o v i s i o n H. 
I L J 1 71T N EI S S W1 1E R E 0 F, 11 i e B u y e r s a n d S e 11 e r s 1 i e r e b y 
a c k n o w 1 e d g e t h eir agreement t h a t t he foregoing i s -a n 
integral part of the aforementioned Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement which has also been fully execi 11ed by t:he parties. 
Buyer D a t e d : 3-/-S& z^Buy/r D a t e d : 3 v - dj 
S e l l e V Datgd; / ?~rf-£A 
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3215 Skycrest Circle • 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
1 September 1986 
Mr. antf Mrs. Allen Grahn 
3735 Emigration Canyon 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Dear Allen *nd Josephine: 
With reference to your option to purchase the one-half .'.; 
acre l^ t adjacent to the lot you have recently-purchased 
from uP' known ?s Brookburn, this is to inform you? that >'; 
on this date we have received an earnest money agreement 
and offer to purchase said one-half aci*e lot and.) we -de -^ 
sire to accept said offer. A-copy of the agreement! is;^ 
attached hereto. 
As you a.re awnr*, there is a period specified^^:which;i|| 
you may excrrr ^e your option. -If you should come
 ; to the 
conclusion v/ithin said time period that you d6;|npt:,wisli;;;: 
to exef^se your option, the buyer would greatlylfappre^.; 
ciate your ro indicating as so.on as possible so" that her*; 
may initiate his construction without unnecessary-delay; 
Hero4\l L. Gre/ory v^rrustee 
Alber-c^Eccles Family Trust 
3215 Skycrest Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Receipt of notice acknowledged this 1st day of September 
1986. 
L r v n n i L v j i I V I V I V I . I g n b k d n u n u u i v i u t Y I 
YesfX) No(0) EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
I IAI I : f*«fLf 
• s f 13£L 
The undersigned Buyer"" _ 
EARNEST MONEY, the amount of ^ l * t / < L -
the form of C u j2e*~£Gftg\4iA. 
, hereby depogj>6 wi th Brokerg 
Dollars ( £ S 2 3 C 2 5 = 
which shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State U 
/Uoto&-
Jkifl jgr"—" Wti„ u Number. 
'"-/• Received b y £ S L 
OFFER TO 
I ,.x P R O P f ^ J Y DESCRIPTION The above slated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated a .fft*± 
. . Uti 
b^ect to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, util ity or other easements or rights of wtiy. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Bu 
accordance wi th Section G. Said property is more particularly described as: — ._ 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES: 
" ^ U N I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY .Wvacant Lot ^ V a c a n t Acreage <Q Other _ _ 
© I M P R O V E D REAL PROPERTY ^Commerc ia l CPResidential G fcondo EPOther 
(a) Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include al! fixtures "and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the propei 
The following .personal proper fy shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: /i/&6L* j ^ 
(b) Excluded i tems, The following items are specifically excluded from this sale: AJe&E. 
UNECTIONS, UTILITIES AMD OTHER RfGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following <f improvements, in the purchase pri 
• public sewer Q connected Dwel l • connected O other Q electricity CI connected 
D septic tank Q connected 0 irrigation water/secondary system Q ingress & egress by private easement 
Q other sanitary system _ _ _ . # of shares . . C o m p a n y . „.__ Q dedicated road • paved 
D public water Dconnected DTV antenna • master antenna D p r e w n e j J c u r b and gutte* 
—
 private water Oconnected • natural gas Unconnected " • other rights . 
prior to closing, G snail not be furnish (d)" Survey A, certified survey ^firShalI be furnished at the expense of _ ^ & j J L £ s i £ _ 





PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is ~&J fr-V1/ I l\V<-< / l>\(9 L*~£ C4-V1_ 
V0& Dollars ( 
A. 
which shall be* paid a&Jbllov 
"fa- »#&" S~CQ ^ ^ v h i c h represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: , ^represent ing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT afdCSins. U f 6 f\ ( L C t ^ f> l & V ^ ^ 
i ©presenting the approximate balance of an existing mortgage trust', deed note, ureal estate coi itract or other encumbrance to be assum 
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at _ _ _ _ _ % per annum with n oi ithly payments of $ . . .__. „. 
which include: Oprincipal ; Dinterest; Otaxes; Q insurance; Dcondo fees; D other _ _ . 
representing the approximate balai ice of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to 
issumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
•vhich include: Oprincipai; Qinterest; Dtaxes; Dinsurance; Dcondo fees; Q other _ _ _ . 
*5^~ 
•^presenting balance, if any, includii tg proceeds from a new . loan, to bo paid as follows: 
rj.dtp^ sdl^ •** *i Other JL 
Gl.occ. -&2J
Zx *K&i*k 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE & ^ 
•2.Q l<h 
if Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume and/or procuTpsSme and t 
fer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing, Buyer agrees to make application withtn 
jys after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed 
Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and /or financing within , 
the option of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice, 
i g obiigat C 5 ^ 
days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, this Agreement snarl be voida 
. towards Buyer's total financing and closing costs, including, but not limited to, loan discount points. Seller agrees to pay $ * 
If this Agreement involves the assumption of an existing toan or obligation on the property, Section f shall apply, 
wi
 Huiwiidde price (, 
4. INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prio 
Buyer shall take title subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions {CC & R's). Buyer O hasSrnas not reviewed 
minium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement. 
5. VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: T J - 4 - l - ^ f p j . <~_ (J C^A^A CJLA- 7 ^ U - * < - *=*«£-
6. SELLER WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:. 
Exceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following: fiffr'lz*-
7. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made 
be satisfied prior to closing: J?L 
fc*-y c-*-£d> c^-U, '(Jjo&y^ A?J^<a 
subject to the following special conditions and/or < or contingencies ' 
JL2 
8. CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before at a reasonable location to be des 
Seller, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in ; 
with this Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R, shall be made as of Odate of possessionJSHate of closing fJ>other 
9. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on C J ^ S A I A , tJ 
. unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
10. GENERAL PROVISIONS. Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporate* 
Agreement by reference. 
11 AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND T IME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer iffers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditi< 
shall have until Q.OO i M ^ ge/3f~ 2. 
. , 1 9 9 *+ . to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall 
EARNEST MONEY to the Buyer. - i # ifjips £—
 yp - .* y? <Scrtr/, lrr& 
Signature of B u Y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ V ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ & ^ C - * * - - Date Signature of Buyer 
CHECK ONE 
^JTCCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
DREJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's Initials) 
QCOUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as^pecified bejow or in tf^attached Adden 
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until (A.M. /P.M 
^^ACfJs Pfo^Ht J^ca^A^^ S) <TfZi<fh^?sd^y. 
19 Yto , to accept 
s<£*?^**^ 
^#,..^ , ^?^^M7^ ^ a t e 
^Tme _ 
Signature of Seller 
CHECK ONE: 
/tfj Buyer accepts the counter offer 
D Buyer accepts wUtLfnodifications on attache^dtiendum 
Date f 7 f l f e ^Q^t^L 
Time _ _ C x 2 ^ i j b T K M - P M ) Signature of 
Signature of Seller 
*£S&f^J^ 
X 
Signature of Buyer 
C O M M I S S I O N . The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to: . 
a commission of . 
. (Bn 
. as coqsideration for the efforts in procuring a buyer. 
Signature of Seller Date Signature of Seller 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must tl 
be completed). 
A. D l acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
SIGNATURE OF SELLER SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
Date Date 
Date Date 
B. Q l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures to be mailed on . 
Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the Q Sailer D Buyer. Sent±>y 
. . 19 . 
Page three of a four page form Seller's Initial 
.. ',„"
 ; : i • . . ' ; | % • 
ueyei --i(X) No (0) 





s INCLUDED I T I M S , Unless excluded herein i, this sal© shall incfud® all fixtures, arid any of the following items if presently attached to the property pluml 
heating, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and drapi 
and rods, window and "door scretms, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage 
opener and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs, 
B. INSPEC I ION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and nc 
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, (nc 
herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. in the event Buyer de 
any additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyei 
C SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received'no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property w 
has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbra 
of any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and applia 
shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition, at closing. 
D„ CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Sellers' knowledge, provided an adequate supp 
water and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right 
E. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK,, Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to tl ie best of Seder's ki owledge, ii i g ::i : ::l v :: 'king • jrder 
Seller has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
I ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Na later^than fiftejinHlB^days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but"'not less than three _(3) days prior tcc ia 
Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against trrepr'Qpecty reqtnn 
consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire, bafa/ice due it 
event of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) flays after riot* 
nonwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written n 
to Seller or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if prow 
for said "Due on Safe" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void. 
G. TITLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (1 5) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing. £ 
shall have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion, or a preliminary title report or» the subject prcc 
Buyer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept. 8uyer shall give written notice thereof to S 
or Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cur* 
defect(s) to which Buyer has objected,. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be i nil and void at the oi 
of the Buyer, and all monies received, herewith shall be jeturnadJo the •..respective; parties,.
 h , 
H TITLE INSURANCE, "If title" insurahce is elected; Sellef authorizes* the Listing' Brokerage^ to. ,ojder,a preliminary commitment for a standard form I 
policy of title' insurance -to'*be issued by;such title insurance company as Seller snail-designate: Title policy'tb be issued shalloon tain no exceptions other 
those provided for in-salcT standard form; and the encumbrances or defects excepted.under the'final contract.of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable:-thn 
an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agroei 
shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge. 
I. EXISTING fENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen ( I S 
after Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto} afta 
the property Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent within three (3) working days thereafter, Buyer shall take title subject tc 
leases, if objection is not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be nt ill and • raid, 
CHANGES DURING TPaNSA*"**!CN Qunng the pendency of this Agreement Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be mace 
n-' - *J*.M<. . -M-M' '*« "f.f <;* - , •. I»T,,- nr* tr rnfo^ii«pi«: *p -nari,.. - '"pf taken without the written consent of the Bt iver 
K. AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreemei 
behalf warrants his or her authority to go so and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERB At AGREEMENTS. This instrument.constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and su perse 
cancels any and all prior negotiations. represVntatwnsrwarfahtiesV understandings ora'greerWents between the parties. There are no verbal agreements whict 
or affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
M. COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and. if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions 
Agreement not expressly modified or excluded therein. 
N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as lie 
damages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfactiori 
express condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money 
shall be returned toJkiyer. Both parties agree that, should either pa.rty deffault in^any of tfie covenants or ^ agreem^nts herein; contained, the defaulting pai 
pay ajl costs and expenses, including a rqasonatye attorney's fe*./irfcich may,arise or accrue, from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, or in pursu 
remedy provided hereunder or by^  applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing* surt fir othervyisef. In'the event theprincipal, broker holding the 
money deposit is required to file Sri Interpleader action in court to resolve :a dispute* overthe earnest mdney deposit referred to herein,'Hhe Buyer an< 
authorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an"amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The 
of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the de 
party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the»principal broker in bringing such action. 
0. ABROGATION. Execution of a final real estate contract if any, shall abrogauuhis Agreement. 
P. RISK OF LOSS. Ail risk of toss or damage to the property shall be borrfe by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the f 
between the date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism; flood; earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall 
ten percent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may, at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to r< 
replace damaged property prior to closing, or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purch8! 
and Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as 
Q. TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY, in the event that this sale can riot be closed by the dat^-^rbvided herein due to-interruption of tri 
strikes, fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God,, of 'similar4, occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing da 
be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more tnan "thirty (30) days beyond the closing date provided herein. The 
time is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing date. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are 
and delivered by all parties to the transaction. 
R. CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution 
of providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the 
rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other r 
shall be assigned to Buyer at closing. 
S. REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shell be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects oth 
those excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) 
warranty deed, containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporat 
said existing real estate contract therein. 
T. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. Selling Brokerage may Have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller. 
U. BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate 
V. DAYS. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays. 
PAGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMI 
j2i^ SkycrcHt ••Jlrule 
Salt Lake City, UI 84108 
21 Woveaber 1986 
"•Mr. arte lire. Allen, Grahn 
5 7 3 > i-^  i S r '* 11 o n C a ny o a 
wait L-lvC i t) , i IT 6V] : I: 
dear Allen anc 3- ssephine:' 
We need to call your at teat Ion, to a mutual 
mistake in connection wita the property located at 
2811 Erookcurn .Road whi c: > j t >i i are in the process of 
acquiring £i-o~ us 
, As you know, the total pi oper fcj consiste I • :)l 
two different parcels. I-ased upon a previous Burvtj1
 f 
we presumed that the driv eway to the ler^er (one acre) 
piece was the boundary. la fjet, however, tae new 
survey shows that the laae is mostly on tne one-half 
• acre piece* The error w; *> I n locatin. "she driveway• 
••othi n,L, ic chan^ .eci la the le^al descriptions. 
You still have the aa-e amount of property that was 
deeded to y :>u. iio»,everf the buyer of the oae-hal f 
acre piece needs to nave your driveway aoved so thet 
he can procei : d vl \ ;: i the construction of hi s home • 
1 Ji: can Love t.Se driveway for :/MU, 
2) -e wiii hjve to refund your ao^ey ana taKe • 
baca tr.L property.. 
. ' w'j a a^ .would you like to do to resolve this 
situation? 
„ u u ,
i
n i cry sorry tin is happened , a n 3 " *e hope 
the matter -: an be ceso1v€d to everyone's satisfaction. 
Sincere.* 
HeroId L. Gregory, Trustee 
Albert Eccles Fa ally Trust 
fjbtA9h&***1 














JOSEPHINE M. GRAHN, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS IN HER OWN BEHALF, 
HAVING FIRST BEEN DULY SWORN, WAS 




WOULD YOU STATE YOUR NAME AND PRESENT ADDRESS 
RECORD. 
JOSEPHINE MAXWELL GRAHN, 2811 BROOKBURN ROAD, 
HOW LONG HAVE YOU RESIDED ON BROOKBURN ROAD? 
SINCE JUNE 13, 1987. 









YES, IT IS. 
ARE YOU PRESENTLY EMPLOYED, MRS. GRAHN? 
YES. 
WHERE ARE YOU EMPLOYED? 
BONNEVILLE SCIENTIFIC. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY IN WHICH YOU PRESENTLY' 
BROOKBURN ROAD, DID YOU PURCHASE THAT'HOME FROM THE 
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 I M I, L I K E ^ j ,- r, . " PARAGRAP- : - _ , F 
I 
25 ! YOU WOULD, 'H m = F I R S T -AGE * h i ^ i i i zN']' % - - " 
DO YOU SEE THAT? 
A YES. 
Q THAT INDICATES: "A CERTIFIED SURVEY SHALL BE 
FURNISHED AT THE EXPENSE OF" AND THEN THERE'S AN ASTERISK, 
AND "PRIOR TO CLOSING." THE ASTERISK LINE INDICATES 
"EXISTING SURVEY ACCEPTABLE." 
DID YOU DISCUSS WITH ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
TRUST THE UNDERTAKING OF A NEW SURVEY? 
A WE REQUESTED A NEW SURVEY AND THEY SAID.— 
Q WHO DID YOU REQUEST THAT FROM? 
A MARY ETHEL GREGORY. 
THE COURT: WHAT WAS THE NAME? 
THE WITNESS: MRS. GREGORY. 
Q (BY MR. ADAMS) WHAT DID SHE SAY? 
A SHE SAID, "WE HAVE A PERFECTLY GOOD SURVEY HERE 
ALREADY AND IT SEEMS LIKE A WASTE OF MONEY TO EXPEND MORE 
MONEY ON ANOTHER SURVEY." 
AND I REALLY DIDN'T SEE ANY REASON TO GO AGAINST 
THAT. 
Q DO YOU KNOW WHAT SURVEY SHE WAS REFERRING TO? 
A IT'S THE 1984 SURVEY FOR BARBARA DANIELSON. 
Q LET ME HAVE YOU LOOK AT WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED 
AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 9 AND ASK IF THIS IS THE SURVEY --
EXCUSE ME -- PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 AND ASK YOU IF THAT'S 
THE SURVEY TO WHICH YOU ARE REFERRING. 
A I KNOW THAT THAT IS THE SURVEY WHICH SHE REFERRED 
TO. I NEVER DID ACTUALLY SEE THE SURVEY. 
Q NOW, IT NOTES THAT THIS PARTICULAR SURVEY, 
PLAT."'-- ' • IBII I, TS Oh -jRVEY F ' -£ BARBARA 
DANIELSOIN 'JK i l-TFI DRR ~ •> 
li ID YiiU DISCUSS AT TriF TIME THAT YOU 
Hh1 'I- i Wll ' I I II'1' I »IJI.' M i l ? 
A WE DIDN'T DISCUSS IT. SHE SAID, "WE HAVE THE 
SURVEY THAT WE HAVE USED TO SEPARATE THE PARCELS." 
I ASSUMED IT WAS THE WHOLE PROPERTY AND NEVER 
CHECKED INTO IT MORE CAREFULLY. 
Q ON WHAT DAY DTD YOU MAKE Th ? 
A WHEN WE REQUESTED THE SURVE' -~«Cz^ . " 
SHE SAID, "WE ALREADY HAVE A PERFECTLY GOOD iuRVE'i GONE 
Q - - , .- _.oG* -'.G/- ' \ - -.A ~ ' -- ' 5 
" < - ; - * " • '.'- • *'''! . " ~ : r M ;•• o 
AGREtMt"N* it _£'i"i. "ESCRI P~ ICf. ;i£ •-;- AN 
LEGAL ;ESC'!"»T ^1, "A**: T. ECCLES, 2811 EAST BROOKBURN 
ROAD. ? 


























A THAT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING. IT WAS SHE WHO GAVE 
THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Q AND AFTER THIS SURVEY WAS DONE, AND AFTER — THE 
PARCEL WAS ACTUALLY DEEDED TO YOUR SISTER; WAS IT NOT? 
A YES. 
Q AND AFTER THE PARCEL WAS DEEDED TO YOUR SISTER, 
THE ROAD WAS MAINTAINED AS AN ENTRANCE TO THE MAIN ESTATE 
PARCEL; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q THEN, DID THERE COME A TIME WHEN BARBARA 
DANIELSON DEEDED THE PROPERTY BACK TO THE TRUST? 
A YES. 
Q CAN YOU TELL ME WHY THAT OCCURRED? 
A SHE DECIDED SHE WAS UNABLE TO BUILD HER HOME' 
BECAUSE BUILDING WAS TOO EXPENSIVE, AND. SHE DEEDED IT 
BACK. 
Q AND WAS THAT PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT YOU HIRED 
MR. TAYLOR TO LIST THE PROPERTY FOR SALE? 
A NO. 
Q THAT WAS AFTERWARDS? 
A YES. 
Q AT THE TIME THAT THE GRAHNS MADE THEIR EARNEST 
MONEY AGREEMENT, OR SUBMITTED THEIR EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
TO THE TRUST, THE TRUST OWNED ALL OF THE PARCEL; DID IT 
NOT, THAT IS BOTH PARCEL 1 AND PARCEL 2? 1 
1 S 7 
1 HOME? 
2 A THAT' C N n T M V -rcc;-rTMr,Mv M V -rtrcTTviONY IS THAT 
3 I ANSWERED -. f A, 
I Q 
5 MR. TAYLOR? 
6 A Nfi, WOT MECESSARM. t nil II 
7 Q Ml I M i n i / IIHI'.rHth! ul1 IH i I I TaYl..OR cHOWED 
9 I A ' ^ \ 
'
n
 ' Q • -EXT CONVERSATION YOU HAD WITH 
.DSEPHINE GRAn . r HAVE BEEN AFTER THEY WENT 
? 
13 A AFTE- ' HROUGH THE HOME WITH HER. 
Q AFTER SHE WENT THROUGH THE HOME WITH MR. TAYLOR? 
A I ;. 
B Q (< DID ' — w CONVERSATION IN JANUARY 
l'i I Ill I 
».. <: •-0,„ ..c'...^ -AN ... OFFER - THE PROPER I i'' 




Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT HAS BEEN 
24 I PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 2 AND ASK YOU IF , 3 ECCGN i I'!: ""--" 














WAS THAT SUBDIVISION EVER APPROVED? 
YES. 
DID YOU SUBMIT ANY SURVEYS WITH THAT SUBDIVISION 
YES. 
CAN YOU TELL ME WHAT YOU SUBMITTED? 
THE SURVEY WE LOOKED AT. 
THE COURT: MR. ADAMS, DID THIS TRANSPIRE AFTER 
CLOSING OR AFTER THE BRADSHAW Ci_OSING? 
MR. ADAMS: AFTER THE GRAHN CLOSING. DID I SAY, 
'? 
THE COURT: NO. YOU SAID, "GRAHN." I JUST 
MAKE SURE. 











CBY MR. ADAMS) WHEN YOU INDICATED THAT YOU 
THE SURVEY WE DISCUSSED, YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT 
' S EXHIBIT NO. 1; IS THAT CORRECT? 
YES. 
WAS THE SUBDIVISION APPROVED BASED UPON THAT 
YES. 
DO YOU KNOW ABOUT WHEN IT WAS APPROVED? 
BY THE PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION IN 
168 
2 ! >o. : - ncRr. ,»H . •... -i iSE < TRYING TO 
3 - ' ' - - M , JDFRSTAN5 M V 5 r 
4 I .EGALLY B INDING 
5 
6 I SEPTEMBER. 
7 Q i i i l l ' l l I sLidlll l l l b LARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT; 
8 IS THAT RIGHT? 
9 I A YES. AND THAT 
MR. ADAMS: I ASK -~ - - -:"~:CKEN AS A LEGAL 
CONCLUSION. 
I.? 
13 I THE WITNESS: WE FEL^ r w,v 
THE COURT: f r i t . ATTORNEYS ( .AN AR> " ' ' - HFFORF 
I , I t\E. 
If5 - • .0CD5..P' 
I ' QUESTION «.' 
Ill | .HE WASN . • _ ,,-•_ .^N. . I_W a - „ i . 
Mi | "nt- ;...URT O U <N' '--< ~ -~ ' " ' ? T ' - ' ) JNDER C " -ND 
THAT EAR^ 
TESTIF IES -^ - • < t t O b N : : : " - = ;OCJME\ " -"3 
SUCH AS A LEGAL. — ' i P ' JS AGREEMENT. SO, THEREFORE, n S 
H O T P R E J u n r r j A i 
I | THE W. • , - . - : • ' -• •-' " <ER = ,AS A ' lC '^ER - t - : ' N . 
2„ , •' -'<- • - ^ ' - >U UNDERSTAND n i m M I i n i b rUns 
DOWN. 
THINGS TO 
THE COURT: FINE. MRS. GREGORY, YOU MAY STEP 
MR. WOODBURY: EXCUSE ME. I DO HAVE A COUPLE 
CLARIFY THE TESTIMONY THAT WE --
THE COURT: YOU MAY PROCEED ACCORDINGLY. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 








NOW, MRS. GREGORY, I THINK YOU STATED THAT YOU 
A QUESTION WHERE YOU STATED CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS 
GIVEN TO THE SURVEYOR AT THE TIME THAT HE 
THE PROPERTY. DID YOU GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE i 
NO. 
SO, YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE 









— YOURSELF, DO YOU? 
NO. 
OKAY. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THIS AESTHETIC 
THAT WAS GIVEN, CAN YOU TELL ME HOW THAT AROSE? 
JOSEPHINE AND I HAD BEEN TALKING MANY TIMES ON 
, AS SHE EXPLAINED, ABOUT VARIOUS WARRANTIES AND 
CONCESSIONS, OR WHATEVER YOU CALL THEM, THAT THEY WANTED 
TO INCLUDE IN THEIR EARNEST MONEY ADDENDUM. AND WE HAD 
TALKED ABOUT DIFFERENT THINGS, BUT AT THIS POINT SHE ASKED 
132 
1 I THOUGHT: THAT ISN'T TOO 8AD. THERE'S PLENTY OF PROPERTY 
2 THERE, HALF AN ACRE. AFTER ALL, IT'S JUST TO KEEP THE 
3 PLACE BEAUTIFUL. IT'S NOT TO DO ANYTHING ELSE. SO, I 
4 WAS — I REALLY WAS SYMPATHETIC. 
5 Q SO, DID YOU TALK TO YOUR BROTHER AND SISTER? 
6 A YES, I DID. 
7 Q AND YOUR HUSBAND? 
8 I A YES. AND I EXPLAINED IT AND MY POINT OF VIEW, 
9 AND IT WAS AN IMPORTANT THING TO KEEP THE PLACE BEAUTIFUL 
10 AND REVERE THIS MEMORY OF ALL THIS. 
11 Q YOU WERE TRYING TO HELP THE GRAHNS TO GET THIS 
12 PROPERTY, WERE YOU NOT? 
13 A YES, I REALLY WAS. I WAS VERY -- JOSEPHINE AND 
14 I HAD A WARM RAPPORT AND I KNEW WHAT SHE FELT. WE FELT 
15 SIMILARLY ABOUT THE BEAUTY OF THE PLACE. 
16 Q NOW, IN YOUR OPINION DOES THAT EASEMENT EXIST AND 
17 STAND EVEN TODAY AS A VALID EASEMENT? 
18 A WELL, IT STATES THAT THE -- VALID EASEMENT TODAY? 
19 Q LET ME ASK THE QUESTION. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU 
20 HAVE TESTIFIED TO MR. ADAMS, HE ASKED DID YOU EVER GIVE 
21 THAT EASEMENT? DID YOU GIV€ THAT EASEMENT? 
22 A WE GAVE IT IN THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT, BUT 
23 WE DID NOT RECORD IT. 
24 Q NOW, HAD YOU TOLD THE BRADSHAWS BEFORE THEY 
25 PURCHASED THEIR PROPERTY ABOUT THIS EASEMENT? 
184 
A YES. 
Q SO, THEY WERE FULLY AWARE? 
A OH, THEY WERE. IN FACT, WHEN I TOLD MR. BRADSHAW 
ABOUT IT I SAID, "YOU KNOW, THERE'S A 15-FOOT EASEMENT 
THERE. I'M SORRY. I HAVE REGRETTED IT SINCE I MADE IT, 
BUT IT'S THERE AND IT'S BINDING BECAUSE IT'S SIGNED IN 
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT. BUT EVEN THOUGH I DON'T LIKE 
IT, I AM BOUND TO GO BY IT AND WE INTEND TO AND THIS IS IT." 
AND HE SAID, "WELL, I DON'T CARE ABOUT THE 
EASEMENT BECAUSE I CERTAINLY AM NOT GOING TO TAKE AWAY ANY 
TREES OR SHRUBS. I'M GOING TO PUT MORE IN AND MAKE IT 
MORE BEAUTIFUL, IF ANYTHING." 
Q NOW, WHEN YOU GAVE THIS EASEMENT, YOU GAVE THE 
EASEMENT RELYING ON THE SURVEY? 
A OF COURSE. 
Q KNOWN AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A SHOWING THE DRIVEWAY AS THE BOUNDARY, IS THAT 
THE ONE? 
Q IS THAT THE ONE OF THE PROPERTY? IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES, OF COURSE, OR WE --
Q OR YOU WHAT? 
A WELL, OF COURSE IF WE HAD KNOWN THAT THERE WAS — 
THAT THE DRIVEWAY WAS NOT THE BOUNDARY, WE NEVER WOULD HAVE 
SEPARATED THE PIECES AS FAR AS THAT GOES. 
Q BUT WHAT DOES THE EASEMENT DO TO THAT PROPERTY? 
1 Q C 
A WELL, IT RENDERS IT UNBUILDABLE. 
Q WHY IS THAT? 
A BECAUSE THE DRIVEWAY IS ACTUALLY ALMOST 20 FEET 
FARTHER EAST AND SOUTH, AND THE BOUNDARIES ARE CLOSER TO 
THAT LOT. AND THEN IF WE GIVE A 15-FOOT EASEMENT BESIDE, 
THERE IS NO WAY HE COULD PUT A HOUSE ON THERE. 
Q NOW, MRS. GREGORY, WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST 
RIGHT OF REFUSAL, WOULD YOU PLEASE LOOK AT PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT NO. 2, PLEASE. I ASK YOU TO READ FOR THE COURT 
THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF THAT AGREEMENT WHICH SETS FORTH --
A NOW, WHICH PAGE ARE YOU ON? THE ADDENDUM? 
Q YES. ON THE ADDENDUM. EXCUSE ME. 
A SORRY. 
Q ON PAGE 3 OF THE ADDENDUM IN THIS PARAGRAPH 
RIGHT HERE. 
WHEN I SAY THAT, YOUR HONOR, THAT'S ACTUALLY 
THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH ON THE PAGE. IT'S THE LARGEST 
PARAGRAPH ON THE PAGE DOWN AND IT'S UNDER ITS SUBPARAGRAPH 
UNDER PARAGRAPH 'D.' 
PLEASE GO AHEAD, MRS. GREGORY, AND READ. 
A IT STARTS "WITH RESPECT"? 
Q YES. 
A "WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE-HALF ACRE LOT ADJOINING 
THE LOT WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS AGREEMENT, SELLER 
HEREBY GRANTS TO BUYER THE FIRST OPTION TO PURCHASE THE 
186 
Q SO, YOU WON'T HAVE TO WARRANT ANYTHING OVER THE 





NOW, MRS. GREGORY, WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY THAT 
DEEDING TO MR. BRADSHAW — AND I ASK YOU TO LOOK 
AT PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 1 AGAIN. DO YOU KNOW TODAY, 
AND HAVE YOU EVER HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THAT PROPERTY 
DESCRIPTION OVERLAPS OR CONFLICTS WITH THE PROPERTY 




NOW, YOU WERE ASKED IF YOU HAD EVER INFORMED THE 
COUNTY THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
ON THAT SURVEY WITH RESPECT TO THE BOUNDARY. DO YOU KNOW 
OF ANY PROBLEM WITH THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION WITH RESPECT TO 




IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE LEGAL 
DESCRIPTION IS OKAY ON THAT, IT'S JUST THE LOCATION OF 
! THE ROAD 
A 
Q 
THAT CAUSED THE PROBLEM? 
EXACTLY. 
SO, IT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION FROM A LEGAL 
SUBDIVISION ON THE SIZE OF THE LOT THAT WAS GIVEN THAT 
THE COUNTY, IN FACT, HAD THE PROPER BOUNDARY OF THE 
PROPERTY; 
A 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
YES. 
1 Q 7 
Q HAS ANYBODY TOLD YOU ANYTHING OTHERWISE SINCE 
THAT TIME? 
A NO. 
Q AS FAR AS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEGAL, OR 
OF THE TECHNICAL BOUNDARY DISPUTE, TELL ME IN YOUR OWN 
WORDS WHAT YOU FEEL IS THE PROBLEM, THE BOUNDARY-DISPUTE 
PROBLEM. 
A WELL, WHAT I FEEL IS THE BOUNDARY-DISPUTE PROBLEM 
IS THE ROAD IS PICTURED ON THE PARCEL 2 IN THE WRONG PLACE 
INSTEAD OF JUST THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN 1 AND 2. 
Q AND FROM ALL OF YOUR CONVERSATION WITH 
MR. MC NEIL AND THE OTHERS, THAT IS YOUR IMPRESSION AS TO 
WHAT THE PROBLEM IS; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YOU KNOW, I DON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND IT. I JUST --
Q YOU STILL DON'T UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A I REALLY DON'T. I DON'T. 
Q OKAY. YOU JUST KNOW THAT THERE'S A PROBLEM; IS 
THAT CORRECT? 
A I CERTAINLY DO. 
Q NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THE SURVEY GIVEN OR PROVIDED 
— WELL, WITH RESPECT TO THE SURVEY PROVIDED AS PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT NO. 12, OR THE DRAWING, I SHOW THAT TO YOU AND CAN 
YOU TELL ME THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH YOU CAN REMEMBER 


























Q AND DO YOU RECALL WHO THAT FRIEND OR NEIGHBOR 
WAS THAT HE WAS WORKING FOR? 
A BARBARA DANIELSON. 
Q DID YOU SEE MRS. DANIELSON IN PREPARATION FOR 
| MAKING THE SURVEY? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT INSTRUCTIONS DID SHE GIVE YOU, IF ANY, 
WITH RESPECT TO MAKING THAT SURVEY? 
A I WAS TO DO A TOPOGRAPHIC SURVEY SUFFICIENT 
ENOUGH FOR THEM TO LOCATE THE HOUSE, AND ALSO DIVIDE OFF 
A HALF-ACRE PARCEL OFF THE FULL PIECE OF PROPERTY OWNED 
BY HER MOTHER AND DAD. 
Q DID SHE INDICATE TO YOU AT ALL WHERE THAT HALF 
ACRE SHOULD BE LOCATED? 
A IN THE SOUTHEAST CORNER. 
Q DID SHE INDICATE TO YOU WITH RESPECT TO WHERE 
THE ROAD SHOULD BE LOCATED IN RESPECT TO THAT HALF-ACRE 
PARCEL? 
A I WAS TO STAKE TO THE SOUTH OR — EXCUSE ME --
TO THE SOUTH AND EAST OFF THE ROA"D, USE THE ROAD AS THE 
BOUNDARY. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO IN PROCEEDING WITH RESPECT TO 
COMING UP WITH THIS SURVEY? 
A THE FIRST THING I DID WAS GO TO THE COUNTY 
RECORDER'S OFFICE AND PICK UP ALL THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS 
10 
u 
1 OF NOT ONLY THE OVERALL PIECE OF PROPERTY, BUT ALL THE 
2 NEIGHBORING PIECES OF PROPERTY. AFTER THAT I LINED OUT 
3 THE SURVEY, MEANING I DREW UP THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION AS 
4 IT WAS — AS I READ IT, AND THEN DREW UP ALL THE 
5 NEIGHBORING PROPERTIES TO SEE HOW THEY FIT TOGETHER. AND 
6 THEN I TRIED TO TIE ALL THE PROPERTIES INTO THE SECTION 
7 CORNER, WHICH WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE. SO, WE HAD TO TIE IT 
8 INTO THE COUNTY MONUMENT SYSTEM AND IN THE SUBDIVISION 
9 I TO THE EAST. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO NEXT? 
A SUBSEQUENTLY I SENT OUT MY FIELD CREW CONSISTING 
,2 I OF DALE BENNETT AND A HELPER AND HAD THEM BRING — MAKE — 
13 SET REFERENCE POINTS, MEASURE TO THE REFERENCE POINTS, 
14 BRING BACK THE INFORMATION. AND THEN DALE AND I TOGETHER 
*1 CALCULATED THE CO-ORDINATES SO WE COULD GO BACK — OR SO 
?» HE COULD GO BACK OUT AND SET THE PROPERTY CORNERS. 
** Q DID HE, IN FACT, GO BACK AND DO THAT? 
A YES, HE DID. 
Q AND DID THAT SURVEYING WORK CULMINATE IN WHAT 
**S BEEN MARKED AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1? 
A YES. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO WITH PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 AFTER 
PINALIZED IT? 
A
 I GAVE IT TO MRS. DANIELSON. 





Q OKAY. MOW, LET ME ASK THIS QUESTION ALSO. WHEN 
MRS. DANIELSON -- SO THAT I UNDERSTAND IT CLEARLY, WHEN 
MRS. — OR WHEN MR. BUTLER GAVE YOU THE INSTRUCTIONS AS 
TO WHAT TO DO TO SURVEY THAT PROPERTY — LET ME ASK YOU 
THIS QUESTION FIRST. EXCUSE ME. 
WAS IT MRS.' DANIELSON OR MR. BUTLER THAT GAVE 
YOU THE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO SURVEY THIS PROPERTY AND 
WHAT TO DO WITH RESPECT TO SURVEYING THE PROPERTY? 
A INITIALLY I WAS CONTACTED BY DENIS BUTLER BY 
PHONE AND IT WASN'T IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT, BECAUSE I 
DID SOME RESEARCH FIRST, BUT THEN WE DID MEET UP ON THE 
SITE TOGETHER AND BASICALLY OUTLINED WHAT MY RESPONSIBILI-
TIES WOULD BE. 
Q OKAY. NOW, THE OUTLINE OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES, 
AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, WERE THAT YOU WERE TO TRY -- ONE OF 
YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES WAS TO TRY AND CREATE A HALF-ACRE 
PARCEL ON THIS SIDE OF THE ROAD; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND ONE OF THE OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES WAS TO 
HAVE THE ROAD BE THE BOUNDARY? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
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Q AND THEN WAS A THIRD RESPONSIBILITY TO CREATE A 









LOT THERE? IS THAT CORRECT? 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
SO, THOSE WOULD BE THE THREE THINGS 
OF YOU AT THAT POINT IN TIME; IS THAT 
YES. 
OKAY. NOW, WHY WAS IT THAT THEY NEE 
PARCEL, FROM YOUR UNDERSTANDING? 
DENIS WAS -- DENIS BUTLER WAS GOING 
A HOUSE FOR BARBARA DANIELSON. 
Q AND THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO GO 
GET A PERMIT FROM SALT LAKE COUNTY? 
A 
Q 









TO DESIGN • 
THROUGH AND 
COUNTY THAT 
t\ HALF-ACRE PARCEL TO BUILD A HOUSE IN THIS AREA? 
THE REQUIREMENTS WILL VARY ACCORDING 
• 
NOW, YOU STATED THAT YOU WENT TO THE 
i SIGNED AND OBTAINED THE LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS OF 
TO Trie ZONES 
COUNTY AND 
THE PROPERTY 




WERE THERE ANY PROBLEMS WITH RESPECT 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY BEFORE YOU — YOU 
LAID THEM 
TO THE LEGAL 
KNOW,WEN YOU 
OUT INITIALLY BEFORE YOU ACTUALLY TRIED TO DO THE 
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DRAWING ITSELF? 
A ANY TIME YOU HAVE AN OLD DESCRIPTION, YOU KNOW, 
YOU GOT TO WORK OUT PROBLEMS. THIS WAS AN OLD LEGAL 
DESCRIPTION WITH RODS AND CHAINS AND YOU KNEW THERE WOULD 
3E PROBLEMS THAT WAY. THERE WAS ALWAYS A PROBLEM IN THAT 
THERE WAS TEN FEET, A TEN-FOOT STRIP BETWEEN BROOKBURN 
ROAD OR THE BOUNDARY OF BROOKBURN ROAD AND THE OVERALL 
PARCEL. 
Q AND DID YOU HELP THE PARTIES OR THE TRUST OR 
MRS. DANIELSON OBTAIN THE DEED TO GET THAT PROPERTY QUIT 
CLAIMED? 
A YES. 
Q TO THE TRUST? 
A YES. AT THAT TIME IT WASN'T A TRUST, SO I WAS 
ONLY WORKING WITH — 
Q THAT WAS MY NEXT QUESTION. COULD YOU TELL ME HOW, 
WHEN YOU WENT TO OBTAIN THE RECORD, HOW THE BROOKBURN 
PROPERTY WAS LEGALLY HELD? DO YOU REMEMBER? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER. 
Q DO YOU REMEMBER WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS IN THE NAME 
OF A TRUST? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER. I COULD FIND OUT. 
Q OKAY. BUT IN ANY EVENT YOU UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU 
WERE TO OBTAIN OR TO DIVIDE OFF AN AVAILABLE LOT CONSISTING 
OF AT LEAST A HALF AN ACRE WITH THE ROAD AS A BOUNDARY SO 
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Q DO THEY OVERLAP? 
A NO. 
Q THERE ISN'T AN OVERLAPPING WITH RESPECT TO THOSE 
TWO LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS? 
A NO. 
Q NOW, SINCE THE TIME THAT YOU ORIGINALLY DID THIS 
SURVEY, YOU HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY- TO GO BACK AND SURVEY 
BOTH PARCELS? 
A YES. 
MR. WOODBURY: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: MR. WALKER. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WALKER: 
Q LET ME ASK YOU WITH REGARD TO THE DISTANCE BETWEEN 
POINT 'A' AND POINT 'C* HOW MUCH DIFFERENCE DOES THE TWO-
DEGREE ERROR MAKE IN THE TWO SURVEYS AS FAR AS FOOTAGE? DO 
YOU KNOW? 
A IT DEPENDS ON HOW FAR AWAY YOU GET FROM POINT «A.' 
THE FURTHER AWAY, THE GREATER THE AREA. IT MAGNIFIES. 
Q GOING BACK AFTER HAVING DONE THIS SURVEY, DO YOU 
KNOW WHAT THE DISTANCE IS BETWEEN POINT 'A' AND POINT 'C 
ON THE ORIGINAL SURVEY? 
A NO. IT WOULD BE WHAT? TWO HUNDRED FEET. 
Q OKAY. AND THEN GOING BACK AND REDOING THE SURVEY 
AGAIN, WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 'A' AND »C IN THE 
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1 POINT TO THAT, WHERE THAT IS. 
2 A RIGHT THERE. CALL THAT 'D.' AND THAT'S AS FAR 
3 AS WE COULD GET. 
4 Q AFTER THAT IT'S FOLIAGE? 
5 A YES. 
6 I Q WOULD YOU DESCRIBE IT AS DENSE? 
7 A EXTREMELY. 
8 I Q DID YOU RECEIVE ANY INSTRUCTIONS FROM BARBARA 
9 DANIELSON AS TO WHAT YOU WERE TO DO IF YOU COULDN'T GET A 
10 HALF-ACRE IN THAT AREA YOU DESCRIBED AS SOUTH AND EAST OF 
H THE PRIVATE DRIVE? WERE THERE ANY CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS 
12 T H A T Y 0 U RECEIVED? 
13 A NO. BECAUSE THERE'S PLENTY OF ROOM FOR A HALF 
j 
14 ACRE. 
15 Q EVERYBODY ASSUMED THAT AT THE TIME WITHOUT 
16 ACTUALLY HAVING THE SQUARE FOOTAGE KNOWN; IS THAT CORRECT? 
17 A THAT'S CORRECT. WE WOULD HAVE -- HAD THERE NOT 
18 BEEN ROOM, WE WOULD HAVE ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS. 
19 j MR. SIMS: THANK YOU. THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
20 THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS, 
21 MR. ADAMS? 
22 MR. ADAMS: NO, YOUR HONOR. I WONDER IF IT MIGHT 
23 BE APPROPRIATE, WE DO HAVE ONE WITNESS-SCHEDULING PROBLEM --
24 THAT WE MAY TAKE A TEN-MINUTE RECESS AND LET ME DISCUSS 
25 THIS WITH COUNSEL. 
THIS TIME. 
THE COURT: MR. ADAMS HAS SOME QUESTIONS. GO 
AHEAD, MR. ADAMS. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ADAMS: 
Q MR. REYNOLDS, AS I' UNDERSTAND YOUR PRIOR 
TESTIMONY, PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 WAS SUBMITTED TO THE 
PLANNING COMMISSION AS A PART OF THE SUBDIVISION APPROVAL; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
A REFERRING TO THIS? 
Q REFERRING TO PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1, THAT IS THIS. 
A YES. 
Q AND WAS THE BOUNDARY OF THE ROAD, THAT IS THIS 
ROAD BEING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TWO PARCELS, A 
SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN APPROVAL OF THAT SUBDIVISION PLAT? 
A . IT WAS VERY CRITICAL. 
Q CAN YOU TELL ME WHY IT WAS CRITICAL? 
A BECAUSE OF THE STEEPNESS OF THAT SITE AND THE 
VEGETATION ON IT THE PLANNING COMMISSION WAS VERY CONCERNED 
THAT THERE BE AS LITTLE DISTURBING OF THE SITE BY REMOVING 
VEGETATION AS POSSIBLE. AND THE ROAD WAS THERE. IT WAS 
VERY NARROW, BUT IT DID — HAD BEEN SERVING ADEQUATELY THE 
EXISTING HOME AT THE BOTTOM ON THE PARCEL TO THE WEST, AND 
TO DISTURB THAT -- THEY TALKED ABOUT AND -- AND WE TALKED 
AS STAFF OF SOME OF THE ALTERNATIVES AND IT ENDED UP BEING 
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1 THAT'S WHAT YOU AGREED? 
2 A PARCEL 1, THAT'S RIGHT. 
3 Q PARCEL 1 IS THE PROPERTY THAT YOU DESCRIBED AS 
4
 THE ONE-ACRE PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
5 A YES, THAT'S CORRECT. 
6 Q AND THE PARCEL 2 IS THE HALF-ACRE PARCEL; IS THAT 
7 MY UNDERSTANDING? 
8 A YES. 
9 Q WAS IT IMPORTANT TO YOU THAT THEY CONTAIN 
10 APPROXIMATELY THOSE ACREAGES? 
11 A IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE HALF ACRE 
12 CONTAIN A HALF ACRE BECAUSE OF ZONING REQUIREMENTS. 
13 Q WAS IT IMPORTANT ALSO THAT IT BE BIG ENOUGH TO 
14 BUILD ON? 
15 ' A ABSOLUTELY. 
16 Q IS THAT CORRECT? 
17 A YES. 
18
 Q AT THE TIME YOU SOLD THE PROPERTY TO THE GRAHNS, 
19 DID YOU INTEND TO GIVE THEM MORE PROPERTY THAN THE ACRE 
20 PARCEL? 
21 A NO. 
22 Q YOU ONLY INTENDED TO GIVE THEM AN ACRE PARCEL; 
23 IS THAT CORRECT? 
24 A YES. 







ROAD; DID YOU NOT? 
IT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING, BASED ON THE SURVEY, 
ROAD WAS -- THE EAST SIDE OF THE ROAD WAS THE 
BOUNDARY. 
SO, IF I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY, THAT YOU 
UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU WERE GIVING THEM THE ROAD BECAUSE IT-








YES, THAT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING. 
BUT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT YOU SELL THAT 
PARCEL THAN IT WAS THAT YOU SELL THE ROAD; IS THAT 
Y E S . ••••.-.•'• 
AND THAT WAS BECAUSE YOU NEEDED A BUILDABLE 





NOW, MR. GREGORY, IF YOU HAD KNOWN THAT THERE 
THAN A HALF-ACRE PARCEL ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THAT 








NO, ABSOLUTELY NOT. 
YOU WOULD HAVE SOLD THE PROPERTY AS ONE PARCEL, 
: PARCEL? 
YES. 
YOU WERE MISTAKEN AS TO THAT PROPERTY; IS THAT 
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Q BUT YOU WERE WILLING TO GIVE THEM A COPY OF THE 
EXISTING SURVEY THAT YOU HAD? 
A OH, YES. 
Q DID THEY EVER ASK FOR A COPY OF THAT SURVEY? 
A NO. 
Q THEY HAVE NEVER ASKED YOU FOR A COPY OF THE 
SURVEY, IS YOUR RECOLLECTION? 
A NEVER. 
Q NOW, I ASK YOU TO READ PARAGRAPH 6 FOR THE 
COURT ON THE SECOND PAGE OF THAT AGREEMENT. 
A OKAY. OH, YES. 
"SELLER WARRANTIES. IN ADDITION TO 
WARRANTIES CONTAINED IN SECTION »C,' THE 
FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE ALSO WARRANTED: THE 
LOT PURCHASED HEREUNDER IS ILLEGALLY 
DIVIDED AND SEPARATE FROM THE ADJOINING 
LOT LISTED BY SELLERS ACCORDING TO SALT 
LAKE COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING RECORDS." 
Q OKAY. DO YOU REMEMBER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT 
AROSE WHERE YOU AGREED TO THE TERMS OF THE LANGUAGE IN 
IN THAT PARAGRAPH? 
A YES. THE GRAHNS WERE VERY INSISTENT THAT WE 
INCLUDE IN THERE THE STATEMENT THAT IT WAS LEGALLY 
SUBDIVIDED, AND WE SAID, WE DON'T KNOW. WE HAVE NO REASON, 
WE HAVE NO BASIS ON WHICH TO SAY OR TO WARRANT THAT IT IS 
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SUBDIVIDED. HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE -- WE HAVE --
IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE HALF ACRE HAD BEEN 
TRANSFERRED TO MRS. DANIELSON AND BACK AND SINCE THAT 
TIME WE HAD BEEN RECEIVING SEPARATE TAX NOTICES ON THE 
TWO PIECES OF PROPERTY. THEREFORE, WE ASSUMED THAT IT 
WAS LEGALLY DIVIDED ACCORDING TO THE COUNTY'S RECORDS. 
Q DID MR. TAYLOR EVER MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS 
TO YOU WITH RESPECT TO THAT PARAGRAPH? 
A YES. HE SAID, "WELL, THEY WANT VERY MUCH TO 
HAVE YOU WARRANT THAT IT'S LEGALLY DIVIDED. SO, IF YOU 
WILL WORD IT IN THAT MANNER, THEN THERE WILL BE NO --
YOU WON'T BE LIABLE." 
Q AND YOU RELIED ON MR. TAYLOR'S REPRESENTATION 
WITH RESPECT TO THAT? 
A THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q BEFORE SIGNING THE AGREEMENT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q NOW, IS THAT YOUR SIGNATURE ON THE AGREEMENT? 
A YES. 
Q CAN YOU TELL ME THE DATE YOU SIGNED THAT AGREEMENT?! 
A MARCH 19TH, 1986. 
Q OKAY. NOW, I ASK YOU TO LOOK AT — STRIKE THAT. 
NOW, MR. GREGORY, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU 
GAVE AN EASEMENT PURSUANT TO THAT AGREEMENT; IS THAT CORRECT?) 
A YES, SIR. 
30<t 
4 
1 I Q NOW, IN YOUR MEETINGS WITH THE SURVEYOR AND 
2 OTHERWISE YOU WERE INFORMED, OR DID YOU FEEL THAT THERE 
3 I WAS ANY INTERSECTION BETWEEN THE PARCEL NO. 2 AND 
PARCEL NO. 1, OR OVERLAPPING? 
5 A WE, OF COURSE, WONDERED ABOUT THAT, BUT, NO, 
6 WE DID NOT ASSUME THERE WAS. 
7 Q DID ANYONE ELSE TELL YOU THAT THERE WAS 
8 OVERLAPPING BETWEEN THE TWO, THE TWO DEEDS? 
9 A YES. I THINK MR. MC NEIL SAID THERE WAS AN 
10 OVERLAP. 
11 Q TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE YOU DON'T KNOW THAT THERE 
12 WAS ANY OVERLAP? 
13 A THAT'S RIGHT. 
14 Q OKAY. AND THAT WAS THE WARRANTY DEED SIGNED 
15 BY YOU; IS THAT CORRECT? 
16 I A YES, SIR. 
17 MR. WOODBURY: NOW, LET'S HAVE THIS MARKED AS 
18 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 16. 
19 (.WHEREUPON, EXHIBIT 16-D WAS 
INTRODUCED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
20 
21 MR. WOODBURY: LET THE RECORD REFLECT THAT I'M 
22 SHOWING DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 16 TO OPPOSING COUNSEL. 
23 MR. ADAMS: WE HAVE NO OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. 
24 THE COURT: MR. WALKER? 








THEY HAD UNTIL AUGUST 1ST TO DO THAT AND 
THE PROPERTY AND MAKE AN OFFER AND THAT 




LIKE THAT, TO CLOSE ON THEIR OFFER BEFORE THEY 
EPT OUR OFFER. 
OKAY. SO THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
SO THEN WE WENT AND WE SAW THE PROPERTY 





SHOWED YOU THE PROPERTY AT THAT POINT I" 
YES. 
DID YOU MAKE AN OFFER TO THEM? 
AND j 
i TIME? 
NO. BECAUSE WE THOUGHT THE WAY HOUSES WERE 
SELLING THAT IT MIGHT BE TO OUR BEST ADVANTAGE TO 






SELL AND THEY WOULD BECOME DISCOURAGED, AND THEN 
BUY IT. 









LOTS OF TIMES. 
WHEN WERE THOSE TIMES? WILL YOU DESCRIBE THOSE. 
WE WERE GOING ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS AND 
-- AND SIT DOWN AND SKETCH THE HOUSE AND 
MY HUSBAND WOULD TRY TO COME UP WITH A F 






Q WHAT WAS THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THAT PROPERTY? 
A $63,000. 
Q HAD YOU SEEN A SURVEY OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME 
YOU SIGNED THAT? 
A YES. 
Q I SHOW YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED AS PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT NO. 1 AND ASK IF YOU CAN IDENTIFY THAT. 
A YES. THIS IS THE SURVEY THAT WE WERE GIVEN WHEN 
WE WENT TO — I GUESS WE WENT TO LOOK AT THE LOT AND THEN 
WE CONTACTED THE GREGORYS AND THEY OBTAINED THAT SURVEY 
FROM MRS. DANIELSON AND WE TOOK IT HOME WITH US TO SEE IF 
THE HOUSE THAT WE HAVE BEEN WORKING ON FOR THE LAST FEW 
YEARS WOULD FIT ON THE PROPERTY. 
Q OKAY. NOW, TELL ME ABOUT THIS HOUSE THAT YOU 
HAVE BEEN WORKING ON FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS. 
A WELL, MY HUSBAND WANTS TO BUILD A HOME THAT HE 
CAN SPEND, I GUESS, THE REST OF HIS LIFE WORKING ON 
ARTISTIC DETAILS. AND SO HE'S BEEN WORKING ON THE 
RENDERING OR THE FRONT AND, YOU KNOW, DIFFERENT THINGS HE 
WANTS TO DO IN THE ROOMS FOR ABOUT SIX YEARS, AND I IN MY 
SPARE TIME WORK ON A FLOOR PLAN THAT I WANT THAT WILL FIT 
INSIDE HIS DIMENSIONS. 
Q AND YOU HAVE THIS HOME THAT EFFECTIVELY YOU HAVE 









































THE CLERK: 17-D. ! 
MR. WOODBURY: DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 17. 
MR. SIMS: NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 17 IS 
(WHEREUPON, EXHIBIT 17-D WAS j 
RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE.) 
(BY MR. WOODBURY) MRS. BRADSHAW, I SHOW YOU WHAT 
MARKED AS DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 17 AND ASK YOU 















THAT IS THE MODEL THAT WE MADE BEFORE WE BOUGHT 
-- OR BOUGHT THE PROPERTY. 
OKAY. AND YOU WORKED ON THAT TOGETHER; IS THAT 
YES. 1 
AND IS IT BASICALLY IN THE CONDITION NOW AS IT 
YOU ORIGINALLY MADE IT? 
YES. 
COULD YOU PUT TREES OR ANYTHING THERE SOMEHOW, 
--
WE HAD TO PUT TREES ON IT TO CONVINCE WARREN 
THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROPERTY WAS NOT GOING 
372 
TO BE DESTROYED. 
Q SO, YOU USED THIS MODEL FOR GOING THROUGH 
PLANNING AND ZONING MEETINGS AND THINGS LIKE THAT AS WELL; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q AND THE WAY YOU BUILT THIS TO SCALE WAS FROM THE 
PLAN THAT IS KNOWN AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 1; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A CORRECT. 
Q SO, IN ANY EVENT YOU BECAME CONVINCED THAT YOU 
COULD BUY THIS PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. THE MODEL CONVINCED ME. 
Q THAT IT COULD BE PLACED; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
Q NOW, YOU THEN MADE THE OFFER ON THE PROPERTY; IS 
THAT MY UNDERSTANDING? 
A YES. 
Q AND THE OFFER WAS ACCEPTED? 
A EVENTUALLY. THE GRAHNS HAD AN OPTION TO PURCHASE 
THE PROPERTY BEFORE US. 
Q OKAY. SO, YOU UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY HAD A SEVEN-
DAY OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY; IS THAT RIGHT? 
A RIGHT. 






HE KNOWS WHAT THE GREGORYS HAD IN MIND. 
THE COURT: THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. YOU CAN 
TO -- REPHRASE YOUR QUESTION. 
(BY MR. WOODBURY) OKAY. WERE YOU 








I DON'T RECALL EXACTLY. I THINK I" 
NEEDED PROTECTION IN CASE OF — 
TOLD ANY 
3 
* WAS THAT THE 
BECAUSE THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE ROAD? 
YES. OR WE KNEW ABOUT THE PROBLEM 
OKAY. NOW, MRS. BRADSHAW, I WOULD 
DR LET ME ASK YOU ONE OTHER QUESTION 









WITH THE ROAD, j 
i 
LIKE YOU TO i 
1 
. WHEN YOU 1 
AND EXCUSE ME 
. WHEN THEY DISCOVERED THE MISTAKE ON THE PROPER-
,.DID MRS. GREGORY OR MR. GREGORY OFFER TO LET YOU SACK 











YES. BUT WE DIDN'T WANT TO. 
WHY NOT? 
BECAUSE WE HAD PUT IN AN INCREDIBLE AMOUNT OF 
ENERGY AND MONEY AND WE WERE LIVING IN A HOUSE 
BEEN VACANT THAT WAS GOING TO BE TORN DOWN, WITH 
CAVING IN, AND WE HAD SACRIFICED SO 
WE DIDN'T WANT TO GIVE IT UP. 
MUCH FOR THE 
OKAY. IF THE GREGORYS WOULD HAVE REFUSED TO 
:LOSE ON THE PROPERTY, WOULD YOU HAVE 
LEGAL ACTIONS TO TRY AND GET THE PROPERTY? 
: INSTIGATED 
385 
ABOUT THE EASEMENT THAT EXISTED TO THAT PROPERTY; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A YES. 
0 AND WHAT WAS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THAT EASEMENT? 
A JUST THAT YOU CAN'T BUILD ON THAT EASEMENT OR 
REMOVE THE TREES. 
Q FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 — 
A FIFTEEN FEET. 
Q AND IT WAS PRIMARILY ADDED NOT TO REMOVE 
VEGETATION ON THAT PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
'A YES. 
Q OKAY. AND YOU WANTED TO BUY THE PROPERTY THAT 
DAY? 
A .YES. 
Q IS THAT MY UNDERSTANDING? 
A YES. 
Q WHY IS IT YOU WERE SO ATTACHED TO THE PROPERTY? 
A BECAUSE I HAD BEEN LOOKING FOR PROPERTY FOR 
APPROXIMATELY EIGHT YEARS AND I JUST HAD A GREAT FEELING 
WITH THE PIECE OF PROPERTY, THE STREET, AND THE AREA. 
Q OKAY. NOW, YOU HEARD YOUR WIFE TESTIFY THAT YOU 
APPARENTLY SAW THE SURVEY BEFORE THE PURCHASE OF THE 
PROPERTY AS WELL; IS THAT YOUR UNDERSTANDING? 
A YES. 
Q AND YOU BUILT THE MODEL ABOUT THE TIME YOU WERE 







[HE OFFER ON THE PROPERTY ALSO; IS THAT CORRECT? j 
YES. 
AND THAT YOU HAVE WANTED TO -- YOU WANTED TO 
BUILD YOUR DREAM HOUSE ON THIS PROPERTY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A 
Q 
YES. ' 1 
NOW, WHEN WAS THE FIRST TIME YOU CONTACTED AN 
ARCHITECT FOR HIM TO START PREPARING PLANS ON THIS PROPERTY? 
A 
STARTED 







WELL, IT MUST HAVE BEEN RIGHT -- I THINK I 
TALKING TO HIM JUST WHEN — AS SOON AS I FOUND OUT 
1 
WAS AVAILABLE. 
SO, YOU STARTED TALKING TO HIM ALMOST RIGHT AWAY; 
CORRECT? 
YES. 
AND WHEN DID HE START TO WORK ON.THOSE PLANS? 
AS SOON AS I GOT THE MAP FROM THE GREGORYS. 
WAS IT A WHILE BEFORE YOU DISCOVERED THE MISTAKE 









I NOTICE THESE PLANS WERE DATED OCTOBER 28TH, 
YES. 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
YES. 
IS THIS JUST A LATER DRAFT OF THE PLANS THAT YOU 
HAD THAT HE HAD BEEN DRAWING FOR YOU OVER A PERIOD OF TIME? j 
i 
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1 LITTLE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF DIRECT. 
2 I THE COURT: FINE. AS I SAID, GO AHEAD AND DO 
3 WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO. 
4
 MR. WALKER: OKAY. 
5
 I. CROSS-EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. WALKER: 
7 Q MR. BRADSHAW, CAN YOU TELL THE COURT IN YOUR 
8 OWN WORDS YOUR FEELINGS WITH REGARD TO THIS PARTICULAR 
9 1 HALF-ACRE PIECE OF PROPERTY. 
10j A WHEN I FIND SOMETHING I LIKE, I KNOW IT. YOU 
11 KNOW, I BECOME ATTACHED VERY QUICKLY. I MEAN, IT'S MORE 
12j THAN JUST AN EMOTIONAL -- I THINK TOTALLY VISUALLY ABOUT 
13 EVERYTHING, SO THE MINUTE I KNEW I COULD WORK WITH IT, 
14j I — IT WAS A CONSTANT THOUGHT PROCESS OF BUILDING THE 
15j HOUSE ON THAT PIECE OF PROPERTY, LANDSCAPING IT VISUALLY, 
16 I WORKING, TERRACING IT EXACTLY. I KNEW EXACTLY WHAT I 
17 COULD DO WITH IT, SO IT WAS PRETTY MUCH MY ULTIMATE DREAM. 
18| Q HOW LONG HAD YOU BEEN IN THE MARKET TO FIND A 
19j PIECE OF PROPERTY TO BUILD THIS HOME ON? 
20| A WE HAD BEEN LOOKING FOR,— REAL SERIOUS LOOKING, 
21 j I DON'T KNOW, MAYBE THREE YEARS. 
22 Q IN YOUR OPINION HOW UNIQUE IS THIS PIECE OF 
23 PROPERTY? 
24 A I HAVE YET TO FIND A PIECE OF PROPERTY ON A HILL 
25 I WHERE YOU CAN SEE A HOUSE AND NOT SEE YOUR NEIGHBORS IN 
Un n 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, ON A C R E E K . IT WAS JUST A VERY UNIQUE 
2 PIECE OF PROPERTY. 
3 Q WHEN YOU MEASURE THE PROPERTY — WELL, LET ME 
4 BACK UP A LITTLE B I T . 
5 AS FAR AS THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS, YOU WERE 
6 OUT DISCUSSING IT WITH C E R T A I N S U B C O N T R A C T O R S , IS MY 
7 UNDERSTANDING. 
8 I A Y E S . I C O N T A C T E D QUITE A NUMBER OF D I F F E R E N T 
9 INDIVIDUALS, C O N T R A C T O R S A N D S U B C O N T R A C T O R S . 
10 Q A N D Y ° U HAVE R E F E R R E D TO, IN AN A F F I D A V I T THAT 
n IS ON FILE WITH THE C O U R T / A B O U T A MR. CRAIG O S T L E R . 
12 COULD YOU TELL US ABOUT YOUR FIRST DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM. 
13 A WELL, I WAS I N T E R E S T E D IN B U I L D I N G A K I N D OF A 
14 DIFFERENT TYPE OF PROCESS THAT THEY DO IN EUROPE, AND I 
15 CONTACTED ONE OTHER COMPANY THAT WAS OUT-OF-STATE AND I 
16 SOMEHOW GOT THE NAME OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRACTORY, WHO 
t7 WAS INVOLVED IN DOING THAT SIMILAR PROCESS. SO, I CALLED 
18 THEM UP AND I WAS GIVEN O S T L E R ' S NAME TO TALK TO, AND HE 
19 SOLD ME ON THE PRODUCT. 
20 Q AND C O U L D YOU MAYBE DESCRIBE YOUR U N D E R S T A N D I N G 
2i OF WHAT THAT PRODUCT WAS LIKE. 
22 A W.ELL, IT IS K I N D OF A — IT'S KIND OF A HI G H - T E C H 
23 CEMENT THAT HAS THIS INSULATED PROPERTY OF ABOUT 22 'R! 
24 FACTORS TO IT, AND SO IT ENCOMPASSES A GREAT LABOR-SAVING 
25 I EFFORT, PLUS IT GIVES YOU A FIREPROOF, S O U N D P R O O F , 
^0 1 
1 A NO.. JUST THAT THEY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO USE THE 
2 HOUSE FOR TESTING AND MONITOR THE PRODUCT. 
3 Q DID YOU DISCUSS THE PRICE IN ESSENCE, THE VALUE 
4
 TO YOU OF THIS PRODUCT? 
5 A NO, NEVER DISCUSSED THE VALUE. 
6 Q WHY DIDN'T YOU? 
7 A BECAUSE I WAS STILL TO GET IT FREE. I DIDN'T 
8 QUESTION HIM ON ANYTHING. 
9 MR. WALKER: NO OTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
10 THE COURT: MR. WOODBURY, DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING 
11 FURTHER? 
12 MR. WOODBURY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
13 THE COURT: MR. SIMS? 
14 MR. SIMS: JUST A COUPLE QUESTIONS. 
15 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. S I M S : 
17 Q MR. BRADSHAW, YOU INDICATED THE SITE PLAN, 
18 DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NO. 18-D, IS DATED 10/28/86. IS IT 
19 YOUR TESTIMONY THAT YOU PUT A LITTLE PRESSURE ON YOUR 
20 ARCHITECT IN ORDER TO COME UP WITH THE DRAWING IN ORDER 
21 TO — 
22 A . DAILY PRESSURE. 
23 Q NOW, THIS LATEST VERSION OR THIS PARTICULAR 
24 VERSION WAS A -- WERE THERE EARLIER VERSIONS OF THIS SITE 
25 PLAN? 
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Q WHAT DO YOU DO FOR A LIVING? 
A I'M A PERFORMER AND AN INSTRUCTOR. 
Q WHEN YOU SAY, PERFORMER, WHAT KIND OF PERFORMER? 
A I'M A JAZZ PIANIST. I PLAY AT SNOWBIRD, AT THE 
DOUBLETREE HOTEL AND AT THE PUTTING GREEN. 
Q ARE THOSE WHAT YOU WOULD SAY JOBS AS FAR AS --
ARE THOSE PERMANENT JOBS? 
A ONE WOULD HOPE THEY'RE PERMANENT. THEY'RE 
REGULAR, REGULAR ENGAGEMENTS. AND THEN I --
Q YOU SET WEEKLY DATES IN WHICH YOU PERFORM? 
A AND I PLAY WEEKLY, YES. 
Q AND YOU ALSO SAID YOU ARE AN INSTRUCTOR. WHAT 
DO YOU INSTRUCT? WHERE DO YOU INSTRUCT? 
A I TEACH PIANO CLASS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
AND I TEACH HUMAN RELATIONS AT THE SALT LAKE COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE SKILL CENTER. 
Q NOW, MRS. DANIELSON, COULD YOU PLEASE -- YOU ARE 
FAMILIAR WITH THE HEROLD ECCLES OR -- NOT HEROLD ECCLES, 
ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY TRUST; ARE YOU NOT? 
A YES. 
Q MR. ECCLES WAS YOUR FATHER; WAS HE NOT? 
A YES. 
Q AND IS YOUR MOTHER MRS. ECCLES? 
A YES. 







THE PROPERTY KNOWN AS BROOKBURN PROPERTY ? 
I WAS A BABY. I DON'T PERSONALLY REMEMBER IT, 
I KNOW THE STORY VERY WELL. IS THAT WHAT YOU 
Q 
A 
WHY DO YOU KNOW THE STORY VERY WELL? 
BECAUSE I WROTE THEIR BIOGRAPHIES, BOTH 






SO, DID YOU DO A LOT OF RESEARCH ON THE 
YES. DIARIES AND SO FORTH. 
WHEN WAS THE PROPERTY PURCHASED? 
1930. 













YES. HE WAS A PARTNER IN A REAL ESTATE 
IN DEVELOPMENT AND SALES AND MORTGAGES, 
COMPANY 
AND AT 
OF THE DEPRESSION THE BUSINESS WENT BANKRUPT. 
HE AND MOTHER LOST EVERYTHING, EVEN THEIR HOME 
FOUND THE PROPERTY IN EAST MILLCREEK AND USED HIS 
ESTATE COMMISSION AS A DOWN PAYMENT AND PAID $40 A 







SO, HE PURCHASED THE PROPERTY? 
YES. 
BACK IN THE 1930'S? 
YES. 






A YES. HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY MONEY TO PAY ANYONE TO 
BUILD IT AND HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO BUILD. HE HAD NEVER 
DONE ANY BUILDING, BUT THEY NEEDED A HOUSE, SO HE BUILT 
IT. SO, HE WORKED NIGHTS WORKING ON THE HOME, AND HE 
STARTED AT 5:00 IN THE MORNING WITH THE LANTERN. AND THEN 
HE WOULD GO TO THE OFFICE, AND THEN GO AND WORK AT NIGHT 
WITH THE LANTERN, AND HE WORKED ALL DAY SATURDAYS. 
Q NOW, YOU WERE RAISED IN THIS HOME; WERE YOU NOT? 
A VES. 
Q vOU HAVE MANY FOND MEMORIES WITH RESPECT TO THE 
HOME, I'M SURE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A YES. 
0 AND YOU ARE VERY ATTACHED TO THE PROPERTY; ARE 
YOU NOT? 
A YES. 
Q NOW, IN YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROPERTY, DO YOU 
KNOW WHEN YOUR FATHER FIRST CONVEYED A PARCEL OF THE 
PROPERTY AWAY, TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER SPECIFICALLY, BUT IT WAS THE 
EARLY *60'S, ABOUT '61 OR --
Q WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THAT CONVEYANCE? 
A hE DEEDED A HALF ACRE ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE 
CREEK TO MY SISTER AND HER HUSBAND, THE GREGORYS. 
0 AND WHEN WAS THE NEXT CONVEYANCE? 










i SEE, WHEN 
YOU WEREN'T ABLE TO AFFORD TO BUILD THE HOME? 
NO. 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
YES. 
OKAY. NOW, WHO PAID FOR THE SURVEY? 
THE TRUST. 
MRS. DANIELSON, WHY DID THE TRUST PAY FOR IT? 
BECAUSE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE TRUST. YOU 
I DEEDED IT BACK TO THEM, THEN WE COULD USE 
THAT IN TRYING TO SELL THE raROPERTY, THAT WE COULD SELL 
IT AS TWO PARCELS. 
Q DO YOU REMEMBER TELLING MR. MC NEIL THE PURPOSE 
OF YOUR ACQUIRING THE PROPERTY AND HOW YOU WERE ACQUIRING 
THE PROPERTY FROM THE FAMILY TRUST? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER TELLING HIM ALL THE DETAILS, 
BUT I REMEMBER TELLING HIM THAT IT WAS TO SEPARATE A 
PIECE FROM THE TRUST, YES. 
Q OKAY. NOW, WAS IT FROM THIS SURVEY, 
MRS. DANIELSON, THAT THE TRUST DETERMINED THAT THEY HAD 
A BUILDABLE HALF-ACRE LOT ON THIS SIDE OF THE ROAD? WAS 
IT NOT? 
A YES. 
Q WERE THERE ANY OTHER SURVEYS DONE ON THAT PARCEL, 
TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE? 
A NO. 
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